IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v48y2004i1p81-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes

Author

Listed:
  • Feldman, David
  • Winer, Russell S.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Feldman, David & Winer, Russell S., 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 81-91, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:81-91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(03)00144-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    2. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    3. Feldman, David, 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 93-101, July.
    4. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Feldman, David, 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 93-101, July.
    2. Alexis Derviz & Jakub Seidler, 2012. "Coordination Incentives in Cross-Border Macroprudential Regulation," Working Papers IES 2012/21, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2012.
    3. Sami, Hind, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
    4. David Feldman & Charles Trzcinka & Russell Winer, 2015. "Pricing under noisy signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 435-454, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Feldman & Charles Trzcinka & Russell Winer, 2015. "Pricing under noisy signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 435-454, August.
    2. Feldman, David, 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 93-101, July.
    3. Farhad Sadeh & Manish Kacker, 2018. "Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 729-748, April.
    4. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
    5. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    6. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Remittances as a social status signaling device," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 305-318, December.
    7. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2021. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    9. Miller, Paul W. & Mulvey, Charles & Martin, Nick, 2004. "A test of the sorting model of education in Australia," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 473-482, October.
    10. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Pay Transparency in Organizations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 395, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Elena Veretennik & Maria Yudkevich, 2023. "Inconsistent quality signals: evidence from the regional journals," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 128(6), pages 3675-3701, June.
    12. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    13. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    14. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012. "The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1247-1260.
    15. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 784-791, October.
    16. Klaus Friesenbichler & George Clarke & Michael Wong, 2014. "Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 5-21, February.
    17. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    18. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 25(Q I), pages 18-28.
    19. Gerald D. Jaynes, 2006. "Competitive Screening and Market Segmentation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1580, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    20. Eun-Hee Kim & Thomas P. Lyon, 2015. "Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(3), pages 705-723, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:81-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.