Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies
We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arrow, Kenneth J, 1974. "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-10, March.
- Baron, David P, 1979. "On the Relationship between Complete and Incomplete Financial Market Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 105-117, February.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. " Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 275-287, May.
- Gonedes, Nicholas J, 1976. "The Capital Market, the Market for Information, and External Accounting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 611-630, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.