Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies
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Other versions of this item:
- Millon, Marcia H & Thakor, Anjan V, 1985. " Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1403-1422, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Arrow, Kenneth J, 1974. "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-10, March.
- Gonedes, Nicholas J, 1976. "The Capital Market, the Market for Information, and External Accounting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 611-630, May.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. " Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 275-287, May.
- Baron, David P, 1979. "On the Relationship between Complete and Incomplete Financial Market Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 105-117, February.
More about this item
- G - Financial Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2004-11-22 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-2004-11-22 (Finance)
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