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Capital control liberalisation and stock market development

Author

Listed:
  • Ross Levine
  • Sara Zervos

Abstract

The authors address two questions: What happens to stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and integration with world capital markets after capital controls are liberalized And what is the relationship between those indicators of stock market development and regulations about information disclosure, accounting standards, and investor protection An analysis of data on stock markets in 16 developing countries suggests the following: a) stock markets become larger, more liquid, more integrated internationally, and more volatile after controls on capital and dividend flows are liberalized; b) easy access to information about firms is positively associated with the size and liquidity of stock markets; and c) countries that officially establish internationally accepted accounting standards and laws to protect investors do not have substantially better- functioning stock markets than countries that do not adopt those official standards.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, "undated". "Capital control liberalisation and stock market development," CERF Discussion Paper Series 96-03, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bru:brucer:96-03
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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