IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fme/wpaper/81.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A market-design response to the European energy crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Filip Tokarski

    (Stanford University
    Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE))

  • Mohammad Akbarpour

    (Stanford University)

  • Scott Duke Kominers

    (Harvard University)

  • Piotr Dworczak

    (Northwestern University
    Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE))

Abstract

Due to surges in gas and electricity prices in Europe, many households will struggle to heat their homes this winter. This paper provides high-level guidance on designing a relief policy in a way that optimally trades off equity and efficiency. We argue that, contrary to conventional economic intuitions, an optimal policy may involve directly controlling prices. Because governments do not have perfect information about households' needs, price controls could improve the targeting of relief through screening out the most vulnerable by offering them discounts for reducing consumption. This could be achieved by “threshold price caps" that lower the price of all energy units below some consumption threshold and price units above the threshold at a higher rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Filip Tokarski & Mohammad Akbarpour & Scott Duke Kominers & Piotr Dworczak, 2028. "A market-design response to the European energy crisis," GRAPE Working Papers 81, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fme:wpaper:81
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://grape.org.pl/WP/81_Tokarski_website.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2021. "Redistribution Through Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1665-1698, July.
    2. Mr. Anil Ari & Mr. Nicolas Arregui & Mr. Simon Black & Oya Celasun & Ms. Dora M Iakova & Ms. Aiko Mineshima & Mr. Victor Mylonas & Ian W.H. Parry & Iulia Teodoru & Karlygash Zhunussova, 2022. "Surging Energy Prices in Europe in the Aftermath of the War: How to Support the Vulnerable and Speed up the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels," IMF Working Papers 2022/152, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour, 2021. "Redistribution Through Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1665-1698, July.
    2. Jianxin Rong & Ning Sun & Dazhong Wang, 2019. "A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 39-86, November.
    3. Groh, Carl-Christian & Reuter, Marco, 2023. "Mechanism design for unequal societies," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-050, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    5. Yuru Guan & Jin Yan & Yuli Shan & Yannan Zhou & Ye Hang & Ruoqi Li & Yu Liu & Binyuan Liu & Qingyun Nie & Benedikt Bruckner & Kuishuang Feng & Klaus Hubacek, 2023. "Burden of the global energy price crisis on households," Nature Energy, Nature, vol. 8(3), pages 304-316, March.
    6. Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia, 2023. "Screening while controlling an externality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 26-55.
    7. Piotr Adamczyk, 2022. "Does the Volatility of Oil Price Affect the Structure of Employment? The Role of Exchange Rate Regime and Energy Import Dependency," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(19), pages 1-10, September.
    8. Zeeshan Anjum Memon & Dalila Mat Said & Mohammad Yusri Hassan & Hafiz Mudassir Munir & Faisal Alsaif & Sager Alsulamy, 2023. "Effective Deterministic Methodology for Enhanced Distribution Network Performance and Plug-in Electric Vehicles," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-37, April.
    9. Szabolcs Nagy & Laszlo Molnar & Noemi Hajdu, 2023. "Understanding the Human Dimensions of the Intention to Use Renewable Energy in Hungary Applying an Extended Model of Theory of Planned Behaviour," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 25(64), pages 830-830, August.
    10. Raphael Koster & Jan Balaguer & Andrea Tacchetti & Ari Weinstein & Tina Zhu & Oliver Hauser & Duncan Williams & Lucy Campbell-Gillingham & Phoebe Thacker & Matthew Botvinick & Christopher Summerfield, 2022. "Human-centred mechanism design with Democratic AI," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(10), pages 1398-1407, October.
      • Raphael Koster & Jan Balaguer & Andrea Tacchetti & Ari Weinstein & Tina Zhu & Oliver Hauser & Duncan Williams & Lucy Campbell-Gillingham & Phoebe Thacker & Matthew Botvinick & Christopher Summerfield, 2022. "Human-centered mechanism design with Democratic AI," Papers 2201.11441, arXiv.org.
    11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Auctions with Ethical Concerns," CARF F-Series CARF-F-515, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    12. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Soesja Grundel & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2019. "Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 37-54, April.
    14. Velez, Rodrigo A., 2023. "Equitable rent division on a soft budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-14.
    15. Philippe de Bekker & Sho Cremers & Sonam Norbu & David Flynn & Valentin Robu, 2023. "Improving the Efficiency of Renewable Energy Assets by Optimizing the Matching of Supply and Demand Using a Smart Battery Scheduling Algorithm," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-26, March.
    16. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2318, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    17. Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    18. Bomin Jiang & Daniel Rigobon & Roberto Rigobon, 2022. "From Just-in-Time, to Just-in-Case, to Just-in-Worst-Case: Simple Models of a Global Supply Chain under Uncertain Aggregate Shocks," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 70(1), pages 141-184, March.
    19. Holzer Jorge & McConnell Kenneth, 2016. "A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 367-388, January.
    20. Chan, Jenny & Diz, Sebastian & Kanngiesser, Derrick, 2022. "Energy Prices and Household Heterogeneity: Monetary Policy in a Gas-TANK," MPRA Paper 115975, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2022.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    equity-efficiency trade-off; market design; price control; energy pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fme:wpaper:81. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jan Hagemejer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/grauwpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.