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Comportamiento estratégico de los bancos centrales al anunciar pronósticos de inflación

Author

Listed:
  • Sebástian Gómez Barrero

    ()

  • Julián A.Parra Polanía

    ()

Abstract

El presente trabajo intenta cuestionar la idea, común en la literatura sobre transparencia, de que los anuncios de los bancos centrales son veraces per se. El documento presenta un modelo sencillo que ilustra el por qué el hacedor de política monetaria podría comportarse estratégicamente al publicar información. El análisis empírico de los pronósticos de inflación publicados por seis bancos centrales considerados muy transparentes, aunque preliminar, es consistente con las implicaciones del modelo y, por lo tanto, con la presencia de comportamiento estratégico en estos pronósticos.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebástian Gómez Barrero & Julián A.Parra Polanía, 2011. "Comportamiento estratégico de los bancos centrales al anunciar pronósticos de inflación," Borradores de Economia 653, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:653
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    Cited by:

    1. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 009614, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    2. Freddy H. CASTRO, 2012. "Señales de política monetaria y movimientos en la estructura a plazo de la tasa de interés en Colombia," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 009908, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anuncios de bancos centrales; pronósticos de inflación; política monetaria; transparencia. Classification JEL: E52; E58; D82.;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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