Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1997

• Frank H. Page Jr., 1997, "Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-13.
• Donald George, 1997, "Production, Quality and Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 4, issue 1, pages 21-31, DOI: 10.1080/758532191.
• Peter Holl & Xeni Dassiou & Dimitris Kyriazis, 1997, "Testing for Asymmetric Information Effects in Failed Mergers," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 4, issue 2, pages 155-172, DOI: 10.1080/758516225.
• Rajeev Dhawan, 1997, "Asymmetric Information and Debt Financing: Hie Empirical Importance of Size and Balance Sheet Factors," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 4, issue 2, pages 189-202, DOI: 10.1080/758516227.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen & Emiel Maasland, 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 97-073/1, Jul.
• Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997, "Contentious Contracts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-109.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-106.
• Prat, A., 1997, "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-118.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997, "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-98.
• Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997, "Contentious Contracts," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6f3c7c98-ae1f-4113-a230-1.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number cb1945aa-057b-48d0-aad2-5.
• Prat, A., 1997, "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number f8eafa82-fa74-4556-a34d-0.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997, "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e.
• Michael Peters, 1997, "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-97-02, Jul.
• Takatoshi Ito Richard K. Lyons and Michael T. Melvin., 1997, "Is There Private Information in the FX Market? The Tokyo Experiment," Research Program in Finance Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number RPF-270, Jan.
• Omar Azfar & Peter Murrell, 2009, "Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, volume 57, issue 2, pages 387-411, January, DOI: 10.1086/592840.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997, "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 105, issue 4, pages 709-751, August, DOI: 10.1086/262091.
• Eicher, T-S & Kalaitzidakis, P, 1997, "The Human Capital Dimension to Foreign Direct Investment : Training, Adverse Selection and Firm Location," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-03.
• Khalil, F & Parigi, B-M, 1997, "The Loan Size as a Commitment Device," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-08.
• Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-15.
• Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997, "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-16.
• Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1997, "Setting standards: Information accumulation in development," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 212, Mar.
• José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 1997, "Speculative securities," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 223, Apr.
• Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1997, "Sequential screening," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 224, May.
• José M. Marín & Jacques Olivier, 1997, "Constraints and non-existence of rational expectations equilibria," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 225, Jul.
• Luis A. Medrano & Xavier Vives, 1997, "Strategic behavior and price discovery," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 238, Sep.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1997, "Free entry does not imply zero profits," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 268, Dec.
• Rudolf KERSCHBAMER & Yanni TOURNAS, 1997, "Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number vie9701, Jan.
• Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1997, "Infrastructure project finance and capital flows : a new perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1861, Dec.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1997, "Are the poor less well-insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1863, Dec.
• Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1997, "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money Thrown After Bad?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, number 43, May.
• Angelina Keil, 1997, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1997," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 70, issue 10, pages 583-585, October.
• Javier León & Raimundo Soto, 1997, "Structural Breaks And Long-Run Trends In Commodity Prices," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 9, issue 3, pages 347-366, DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199705)9:3<.
• Keith Waehrer, 1997, "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9702004, Feb, revised 22 May 1997.
• Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman, 1997, "Market Crashes Without External Shocks," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703009, Mar, revised 25 Nov 1997.
• Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997, "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703010, Mar, revised 28 Apr 1998.
• Massimo Giannini, 1997, "Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9704002, Apr.
• Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997, "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9706002, Jun.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Oscar Volij, 1997, "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711001, Nov.
• William Novshek & Lynda Thoman, 1997, "Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), number FS IV 97-13, Jun.
• Cawley, John & Philipson, Tomas J., 1997, "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," Working Papers, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, number 132.
• Goerke, Laszlo, 1997, "A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure," Discussion Papers, Series II, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy", number 357.
• Kübler, Dorothea, 1997, "Using private job agencies: Optimal screening or cream skimming?," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,53.

1996

• Bruno Cassiman, 1996, "Influence activity and the organization of research and development," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 264, Jun, revised Dec 1997.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1996, "Economic implications for Turkey of a customs union with the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1599, May.
• Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1996, "Capital control liberalization and stock market development," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1622, Jul.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1996, "Open economies work better! Did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1636, Aug.
• Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Dooley, Michael & Leipziger, Danny & Walsh, Carl, 1996, "The lender of last resort function under a currency board : the case of Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1648, Sep.
• van de Walle, Dominique, 1996, "Assessing the welfare impacts of public spending," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1670, Oct.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1996, "Are there dynamic gains from a poor-area development program?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1695, Dec.
• Shah, Shekhar & Mishra, Deepak & Panagariya, Arvind, 1996, "Demand elasticities in international trade : are they really low?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1712, Dec.
• Takatoshi Ito & Richard K. Lyons & Michael T. Melvin, 1996, "Is There Private Information in the FX Market? The Tokyo Experiment," Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business, number _005, Jul.
• Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion & Christian Gollier, 1996, "Peer Grouping in An Adverse Selection Model," Discussion Papers, University College London, Department of Economics, number 96-24 ISSN 1350-6722, Nov.
• Klodt, Henning, 1996, "Regulating network-based industries: the case of telecommunications," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 766.
• Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 27, Feb.
• Dennis Epple & Linda Argote & Kenneth Murphy, 1996, "An Empirical Investigation of the Microstructure of Knowledge Acquisition and Transfer Through Learning by Doing," Operations Research, INFORMS, volume 44, issue 1, pages 77-86, February, DOI: 10.1287/opre.44.1.77.
• Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, 1996, "Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, volume 23, issue 2, pages 149-172, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF00925337.
• David Malueg & Shunichi Tsutsui, 1996, "Coalition-proof information exchanges," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 63, issue 3, pages 259-278, October, DOI: 10.1007/BF01227436.
• Gerald Caprio & Michael Dooley & Danny Leipziger & Carl Walsh, 1996, "The lender of last resort function under a currency board: The case of Argentina," Open Economies Review, Springer, volume 7, issue 1, pages 625-650, March, DOI: 10.1007/BF01886217.
• Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1996, "Managerial Compensation Schemes with Informed Principals," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 9605, Feb.
• Leonard, Jonathan S. & Van Audenrode, Marc, 1996, "Persistence of Firm and Individual Wage Components," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9607.
• Dessy, Sylvain E., 1996, "Subsidy-Allocation Rules for Infant Industries," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9621.
• Smith, L, 1996, "Do Rational Traders Frenzy?," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 96-20.
• Smith, L., 1996, "On the Irrelevance of Trade Timing," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 96-6.
• Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996, "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 96-7.
• Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1996, "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 96-8.
• Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996, "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5605, Jun.
• Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1996, "Federal Reserve Private Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5692, Jul.
• Smith, L. & Sorensen, P., 1996, "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 115.
• Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 126.
• Mason, R, 1996, "An Option-Based Model of Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 128.
• Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1168, Oct.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1173, Oct.
• Armstrong, Mark, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing with imperfectly informed consumers," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 36332, Nov.
• Gordon, Roger H & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1996, "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 86, issue 5, pages 1057-1075, December.
• Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996, "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 103-118, Summer.
• Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996, "Developing Countries And Environmental Protection: The Effect Of Budget Balance And Pollution Ceiling Constraints," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers, Utah State University, Economics Department, number 28347, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28347.
• Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996, "An Agenda For The Design And Study Of International Environmental Agreements," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers, Utah State University, Economics Department, number 28353, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28353.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518r.
• Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., 1996, "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9609.
• Burguet, R. & Vives, X., 1996, "Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 323.96.
• Caballe, J. & Sakovics, J., 1996, "Overconfident Spiculation with Imperfect Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 336.96.
• Kuhn, K.U. & Martinez, C., 1996, "Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and price Volatility," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 337.96.
• Emons, W, 1996, "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 356.96.
• Jose Marin & Rohit Rahi, 1996, "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Archive Working Papers, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, number 024, Aug.
• James Dow & Rohit Rahi, 1996, "Informed Trading, Investment and Welfare," Archive Working Papers, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, number 029, Nov.
• Penno, M, 1996, "Unobservable precision choices in financial reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 34, issue 1, pages 141-149, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Evans, JH & Sridhar, S, 1996, "Multiple control systems, accrual accounting, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 34, issue 1, pages 45-65, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Lambrecht, B., 1996, "The Timing of Arbitrage: An Option Approach," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9606.
• Sudipto Bhattacharya & L-A Gérard-Varet & Claude d'Aspremont, 1996, "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number /1996/293, Mar.
• John Livernois & C.J. McKenna, 1996, "Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 120.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010, "Financing Harmful Bubbles," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-227, Sep.
• Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2012, "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-282, Jun.
• Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1996, "Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 96s-14, Apr.
• H. Landis Gabel & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1996, "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 96s-21, Jul.
• Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996, "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 96s-27, Oct.
• Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 1996, "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp1996_9604.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET , Louis-André, 1996, "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996012, Apr.
• Donati, P., 1996, "Two Roles for Monetary Policy when the Asset Market is Incomplete and Information is Asymmetric," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996024, May.
• HEIFETZ, Aviad & MINELLI, Enrico, 1996, "Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996029, May.
• HAMILTON , Jonathan & THISSE , Jacques-François, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996066, Dec.
• Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1996, "Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1295, Jan.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996, "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1421, Jun.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996, "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1426, Jun.
• Davidson, Malcolm, 1996, "Arbitrage, Hedging and Financial Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1454, Aug.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996, "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1460, Sep.
• Kühn, Kai-Uwe & Martínez, Catalina B, 1996, "Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1472, Sep.
• Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1996, "Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1475, Sep.
• Emons, Winand, 1996, "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1487, Oct.
• Degeorge, François & Moselle, Boaz & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1996, "Hedging and Gambling: Corporate Risk Choice when Informing the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1520, Dec.
• Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 1996, "Soft budget constraint and stock price information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119157, Nov.
• Raith, Michael A., 1996, "Product differentiation, uncertainty and the stability of collusion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 6770, Oct.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996, "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-05.
• S. Sorin, 1996, "Bluff and reputation," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-08.
• S. Marette, 1996, "Bargaining versus price competition under adverse selection," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-17.
• Natale, P., 1996, "Posted vs. Negotiated Prices under Incompelte Information," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9603.
• Rychen, F. & Solonandrasana, B., 1996, "Le blanchiment des capitaux provenant des activites criminelles: Une approche en terme de capital-agent," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a06.
• Lyk-Jensen, P., 1996, "Some Suggestions on How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals Are Affiliated," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a27.
• Gaumont, D. & Michel, P., 1996, "Confiance et equilibre economique," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96c06.
• Grant, S. & Polak, B. & Kajii, A., 1996, "Preference for Information," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 298.
• Boldrin, M. & Christiano, L.J. & Fischer, J.D.M., 1996, "Asset Pricing Lessons for Modeling Business Cycles," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 268.
• A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1996, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0073, Oct.
• Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 73.
• Repullo,R. & Suarez,J., 1996, "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9604.
• Denis, J-E, 1996, "Fitting Public Relations into the International Communication Mix," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.05.
• Denis, J-E, 1996, "Modelisation du controle des relations publiques en marketing international," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.06.
• Probst, G & Prange, C, 1996, ""Un-Learning" as Transition Process in Building Strategic Networks," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.16.
• Probst, G & Buchel, B & Raub, S, 1996, "Knowledge as a Strategic Resource," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.21.
• Caron, L. & Dionne, G., 1996, "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 96-02.
• Faure Grimaud, A., 1996, "Structure Financiere et Concurrence Imparfaite: Une Analyse de la Litterature Recente," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.418.
• Faure Grimaud, A., 1996, "The Regulation of Predatory Firms," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.419.
• Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996, "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.429.
• Cremer, J. & Khalil, F & Rochet, J.-C., 1996, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 976.425.
• Das, N., 1996, "Dynamic Regulation with Technological Progress," Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-, number 135.
• Azondekon, S.H. & Martel, J.M., 1996, ""Value" of Additional Information in Multicriterion Analysis Under Uncertainty," Papers, Laval - Faculte des sciences de administration, number 96-41.
• Dessy, S.E., 1996, "Subsidy-Allocation Rules for Infant Industries," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 9621.
• Leonard, J.S. & Van Audenrode, M., 1996, "Persistence of Firm and Individual Wage Components," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9607.
• Pezanis-Christou, P., 1996, "Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/15.
• Osmundsen, P., 1996, "Taxing Internationally Mobile Individuals - A Case of Countervailing Incentives," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 8/96.
• Mokrane, M., 1996, "Bank Financing Strategies, Diversification by Certificates of Deposit, and Securitization," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9603.
• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9605.
• Sorin, S., 1996, "Bluff and Reputation," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9608.
• Marette, S., 1996, "Bargaining Versus Price Competition Under Adverse Selection," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9617.
• Serrano-Cinca, C., 1996, "From Financial Information to Strategic Groups: A Self-Organizing Neural Network Approach," Papers, University of Southampton - Department of Accounting and Management Science, number 96-125.
• Acemoglu, D & Zilibotti, F, 1996, "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies, number 607.
• Boozer, M. & Philipson, T., 1996, "The Private Demand for Information and the Effects of Public Testing Programs: The Case of HIV," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 750.
• McKenna, C.J. & Livernois, J., 1996, "Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance, number 1996-7.
• François Degeorge & B. Moselle & R.J. Zeckhauser, 1996, "Hedging and Gambling: Corporate Risk Choice When Informing the Market," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00606074.
• Lagerlöf, Johan, 1996, "A welfare analysis of strategic information revelation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 109, Mar.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1996, "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 126, Sep.
• Müller, Holger M., 1996, "The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model with Exponential Utility," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 145, Dec.
• Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1996, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, number 61.
• James A. Mirrlees, 1996, "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-1, Dec.
• Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996, "William Vickrey: A Pioneer in the Economics of Incentives," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-2, Dec.
• Ramon Caminal & Xavier Vives, 1996, "Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-Based Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 27, issue 2, pages 221-239, Summer.
• Arifovic, J & Eaton, C, 1996, "The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp96-05.
• Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 1996, "Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 211-227.
• Rustichini, Aldo & Villamil, Anne P, 1996, "Intertemporal Pricing in Markets with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 211-227, August.
• Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996, "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 33-68, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499124.
• Jonathan Hamilton & Jacques-François Thisse, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 379-397, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142.
• Inés Macho-Stadler & J. Pérez-Castrillo, 1996, "Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 99-115, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499127.
• John Fingleton & Patrick Waldron, 1996, "Optimal Determination of Bookmakers' Betting Odds: Theory and Tests," Economics Technical Papers, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, number 969.
• Bovenberg, A.L. & Gordon, R.H., 1996, "Why is capital so immobile internationally? Possible explanation and implications for capital income taxation," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6a131c21-fd9a-4d83-8d9a-7.
• Michael Peters, 1996, "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-01, Apr.
• Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996, "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-02, Dec.
• Winand Emons, 1996, "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp9608, Aug.
• José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 1996, "Information revelation and market incompleteness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 145, Feb.
• Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1996, "Agency costs in the process of development," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 157, Feb.
• Luís A. Medrano, 1996, "Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 165, Feb.
• Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996, "Dynamic adverse selection and debt," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 196, Mar, revised Dec 1996.
• Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 233, Mar, revised Aug 1997.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996, "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9602, Oct.
• Paolo G. GARELLA, 1996, "Informational rents in interbank Competition," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1996011, Mar.
• Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak, 1996, "Preference for Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1114, Jan.
• de Meza, David & Southey, Clive, 1996, "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 106, issue 435, pages 375-386, March.
• Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 1996, "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 1, Feb.
• Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1996, "The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or pull?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 2, pages 389-418, March.
• Haramillo, Fidel & Schiantarelli, Fabio & Weiss, Andrew, 1996, "Capital market imperfections before and after financial liberalization: An Euler equation approach to panel data for Ecuadorian firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 2, pages 367-386, December.
• Batabyal, Amittrajeet A., 1996, "An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 3-9, October.

1995

• Pierre Lefebvre & Philip Merrigan, 1995, "Welfare Benefits and incomes of Canadian Families: A Dynamic Analysis of Marital-Cohabitation Dissolution," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9504, Feb.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1995, "Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9508, Jul.
• Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 1995, "Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement: A Graphical Analysis," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9511, Oct.
• Boldrin, Michele & Christiano, Lawrence J. & Fisher, Jonas D. M., 1995, "Asset pricing lessons for modeling business cycles," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 3915, Sep.