Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1996

• S. Sorin, 1996, "Bluff and reputation," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-08.
• S. Marette, 1996, "Bargaining versus price competition under adverse selection," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-17.
• Natale, P., 1996, "Posted vs. Negotiated Prices under Incompelte Information," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9603.
• Rychen, F. & Solonandrasana, B., 1996, "Le blanchiment des capitaux provenant des activites criminelles: Une approche en terme de capital-agent," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a06.
• Lyk-Jensen, P., 1996, "Some Suggestions on How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals Are Affiliated," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a27.
• Gaumont, D. & Michel, P., 1996, "Confiance et equilibre economique," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96c06.
• Grant, S. & Polak, B. & Kajii, A., 1996, "Preference for Information," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 298.
• Boldrin, M. & Christiano, L.J. & Fischer, J.D.M., 1996, "Asset Pricing Lessons for Modeling Business Cycles," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 268.
• A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1996, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0073, Oct.
• Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 73.
• Repullo,R. & Suarez,J., 1996, "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9604.
• Denis, J-E, 1996, "Fitting Public Relations into the International Communication Mix," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.05.
• Denis, J-E, 1996, "Modelisation du controle des relations publiques en marketing international," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.06.
• Probst, G & Prange, C, 1996, ""Un-Learning" as Transition Process in Building Strategic Networks," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.16.
• Probst, G & Buchel, B & Raub, S, 1996, "Knowledge as a Strategic Resource," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.21.
• Caron, L. & Dionne, G., 1996, "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques., number 96-02.
• Faure Grimaud, A., 1996, "Structure Financiere et Concurrence Imparfaite: Une Analyse de la Litterature Recente," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.418.
• Faure Grimaud, A., 1996, "The Regulation of Predatory Firms," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.419.
• Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996, "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 96.429.
• Cremer, J. & Khalil, F & Rochet, J.-C., 1996, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 976.425.
• Das, N., 1996, "Dynamic Regulation with Technological Progress," Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-, number 135.
• Azondekon, S.H. & Martel, J.M., 1996, ""Value" of Additional Information in Multicriterion Analysis Under Uncertainty," Papers, Laval - Faculte des sciences de administration, number 96-41.
• Dessy, S.E., 1996, "Subsidy-Allocation Rules for Infant Industries," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 9621.
• Leonard, J.S. & Van Audenrode, M., 1996, "Persistence of Firm and Individual Wage Components," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9607.
• Pezanis-Christou, P., 1996, "Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/15.
• Osmundsen, P., 1996, "Taxing Internationally Mobile Individuals - A Case of Countervailing Incentives," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 8/96.
• Mokrane, M., 1996, "Bank Financing Strategies, Diversification by Certificates of Deposit, and Securitization," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9603.
• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9605.
• Sorin, S., 1996, "Bluff and Reputation," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9608.
• Marette, S., 1996, "Bargaining Versus Price Competition Under Adverse Selection," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9617.
• Serrano-Cinca, C., 1996, "From Financial Information to Strategic Groups: A Self-Organizing Neural Network Approach," Papers, University of Southampton - Department of Accounting and Management Science, number 96-125.
• Acemoglu, D & Zilibotti, F, 1996, "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies, number 607.
• Boozer, M. & Philipson, T., 1996, "The Private Demand for Information and the Effects of Public Testing Programs: The Case of HIV," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 750.
• McKenna, C.J. & Livernois, J., 1996, "Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance, number 1996-7.
• François Degeorge & B. Moselle & R.J. Zeckhauser, 1996, "Hedging and Gambling: Corporate Risk Choice When Informing the Market," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00606074.
• Lagerlöf, Johan, 1996, "A welfare analysis of strategic information revelation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 109, Mar.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1996, "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 126, Sep.
• Müller, Holger M., 1996, "The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model with Exponential Utility," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 145, Dec.
• Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1996, "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, number 61.
• Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 27, Feb.
• James A. Mirrlees, 1996, "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-1, Dec.
• Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996, "William Vickrey: A Pioneer in the Economics of Incentives," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 1996-2, Dec.
• Ramon Caminal & Xavier Vives, 1996, "Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-Based Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 27, issue 2, pages 221-239, Summer.
• Arifovic, J & Eaton, C, 1996, "The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp96-05.
• Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 1996, "Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 211-227.
• Rustichini, Aldo & Villamil, Anne P, 1996, "Intertemporal Pricing in Markets with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 211-227, August.
• Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996, "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 33-68, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499124.
• Jonathan Hamilton & Jacques-François Thisse, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 379-397, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142.
• Inés Macho-Stadler & J. Pérez-Castrillo, 1996, "Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 99-115, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499127.
• John Fingleton & Patrick Waldron, 1996, "Optimal Determination of Bookmakers' Betting Odds: Theory and Tests," Economics Technical Papers, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, number 969.
• Bovenberg, A.L. & Gordon, R.H., 1996, "Why is capital so immobile internationally? Possible explanation and implications for capital income taxation," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6a131c21-fd9a-4d83-8d9a-7.
• Michael Peters, 1996, "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-01, Apr.
• Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996, "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-02, Dec.
• Winand Emons, 1996, "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp9608, Aug.
• José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 1996, "Information revelation and market incompleteness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 145, Feb.
• Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1996, "Agency costs in the process of development," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 157, Feb.
• Luís A. Medrano, 1996, "Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 165, Feb.
• Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996, "Dynamic adverse selection and debt," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 196, Mar, revised Dec 1996.
• Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 233, Mar, revised Aug 1997.
• Bruno Cassiman, 1996, "Influence activity and the organization of research and development," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 264, Jun, revised Dec 1997.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996, "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9602, Oct.
• Paolo G. GARELLA, 1996, "Informational rents in interbank Competition," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1996011, Mar.
• Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak, 1996, "Preference for Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1114, Jan.
• de Meza, David & Southey, Clive, 1996, "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 106, issue 435, pages 375-386, March.
• Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 1996, "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 1, Feb.
• Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1996, "The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or pull?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 2, pages 389-418, March.
• Haramillo, Fidel & Schiantarelli, Fabio & Weiss, Andrew, 1996, "Capital market imperfections before and after financial liberalization: An Euler equation approach to panel data for Ecuadorian firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 2, pages 367-386, December.
• Batabyal, Amittrajeet A., 1996, "An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 3-9, October.

1995

• Pierre Lefebvre & Philip Merrigan, 1995, "Welfare Benefits and incomes of Canadian Families: A Dynamic Analysis of Marital-Cohabitation Dissolution," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9504, Feb.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1995, "Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9508, Jul.
• Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 1995, "Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement: A Graphical Analysis," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9511, Oct.
• Boldrin, Michele & Christiano, Lawrence J. & Fisher, Jonas D. M., 1995, "Asset pricing lessons for modeling business cycles," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 3915, Sep.
• Françoise FORGES, 1995, "Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1995014, Mar.
• Dees, J. Gregory & Cramton, Peter C., 1995, "Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler1," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, volume 5, issue 4, pages 823-832, October.
• Sandeep Baliga & Ben Polak, 1995, "Banks versus Bonds: A Simple Theory of Comparative Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1100, May.
• Matthews, Steven A, 1995, "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 63, issue 3, pages 567-589, May.
• Lewis, Jeffrey D. & Robinson, Sherman & Wang, Zhi, 1995, "Beyond the Uruguay Round: The implications of an Asian free trade area," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 6, issue 1, pages 35-90.
• Feltenstein, Andrew & Shah, Anwar, 1995, "General equilibrium effects of investment incentives in Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 2, pages 253-269, April.
• Spiegel, Mark M., 1995, "Threshold effects in international lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 2, pages 341-356, April.
• Oks, Daniel & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1995, "Mexico after the debt crisis: is growth sustainable?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 1, pages 155-178, June.
• Demirguc-Kunt, Ash & Huizinga, Harry, 1995, "Barriers to portfolio investments in emerging stock markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 2, pages 355-374, August.
• Clarke, George R. G., 1995, "More evidence on income distribution and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 2, pages 403-427, August.
• Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995, "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 10, issue 2, pages 255-283, August.
• Ermolov, Andrew N., 1995, "Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 2, pages 349-363.
• Alexander-Cook, Kim & Bernhardt, Dan & Roberts, Joanne, 1995, "Riding Free on the Signals of Others," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273340, Aug, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273340.
• Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995, "The Impact Of Information On Land Development: A Dynamic And Stochastic Analysis," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers, Utah State University, Economics Department, number 28356, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28356.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1995, "The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers," SSRI Workshop Series, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute, number 292704, Apr, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.292704.
• Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., 1995, "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9415r.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1995, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518.
• Macho-Stadler, I. & Perez-Castillo, D., 1995, "Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 290.95.
• Barros, F. & Macho-Stadler, M., 1995, "Competition for Managers and Market Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 320.95.
• Bushman, Rm & Indjejikian, Rj, 1995, "Voluntary Disclosures And The Trading Behavior Of Corporate Insiders," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 33, issue 2, pages 293-316, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Daley, La & Hughes, Js & Rayburn, Jd, 1995, "The Impact Of Earnings Announcements On The Permanent Price Effects Of Block Trades," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 33, issue 2, pages 317-334, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24914.
• Antle, R & Fellingham, J, 1995, "Information rents and preferences among information systems in a model of resource allocation," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 33, issue , pages 41-58, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Evans, JH, 1995, "Discussion of information rents and preferences among information systems in a model of resource allocation," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 33, issue , pages 59-63, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24913.
• Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995, "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 298., Aug.
• Tracy R. Lewis & Michel Poitevin, 1995, "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 95s-01, Jan.
• Michel Poitevin, 1995, "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 95s-03, Jan.
• Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre & Ngo Van Long, 1995, "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 95s-33, Jul.
• Javier Suarez & Oren Sussman, 1995, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp1995_9518.
• Jamal, K. & Sunder, S., 1995, "Biased Heuristic Traders and Attainment of Bayesian Equilibria in Double Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-09.
• Epple, D. & Argote, L. & Darr, E.D., 1995, "The Acquisition, Transfer and Depreciation of Knowledge in Service Organisations: Productivity in Franchises," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-16.
• Epple, D. & Argote, L. & Murphy, K., 1995, "An Empiraical Investigation of the Micro Structure of Knowledge Acquisition and Transfer Through Learning by Doing," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-17.
• Rao, R. & Argote, L., 1995, "Collective Learning and Forgetting; The Effects of Turnover and Group Structure," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-18.
• HEIFETZ, Aviad & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1995, "Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1995079, Dec.
• Leon, Javier & Soto, Raimundo, 1995, "Structural breaks and long-run trends in commodity prices," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1406, Jan.
• Lewis, Jeffrey D. & Robinson, Sherman & Zhi Wang, 1995, "Beyond the Uruguay Round : the implications of an Asian free trade area," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1467, Jun.
• Angelina Keil, 1995, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1994," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 68, issue 1, pages 22-23, January.
• R. Strausz, 1995, "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION)," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9510002, Oct, revised 03 Apr 1996.
• Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2005, "Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 732.
• Muthoo, Abhinay & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2010, "Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 939.
• Amelung, Torsten & Wiebelt, Manfred, 1995, "Ansatzpunkte zur Reduktion der globalen CO₂-Emissionen," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 45, issue 3, pages 172-177.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Third- and higher-price auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,3.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Eine Diskussion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,4.
• Eric D. Darr & Linda Argote & Dennis Epple, 1995, "The Acquisition, Transfer, and Depreciation of Knowledge in Service Organizations: Productivity in Franchises," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 41, issue 11, pages 1750-1762, November, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.11.1750.
• GAUDET, Gerard & LASSERRE, Pierre & LONG, Ngo Van, 1995, "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9515.
• Dionne, G. & Fluet, C., 1995, "Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement : a Graphical Analysis," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9533.
• Dionne, G. & Fluet, C., 1995, "Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement : A Graphical Analysis," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 9533.
• Louis Kaplow, 1992, "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 3958, Jan.
• Michele Boldrin & Lawrence J. Christiano & Jonas D.M. Fisher, 1995, "Asset Pricing Lessons for Modeling Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5262, Sep.
• Owen Lamont, 1995, "Macroeconomics Forecasts and Microeconomic Forecasters," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5284, Oct.
• Michel Poitevin, 1995, "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1135, Jul.
• Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1995, "Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 95beq, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995, "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 95geb, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Armstrong, Mark, 1995, "Delegation and discretion," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 17069.
• Kim Alexander-Cook & Dan Bernhardt & Joanne Roberts, 1995, "Riding Free On The Signals Of Others," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 927, Aug.
• Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Mahenc, Philippe & Moreaux, Michel, 1995, "Sequential Location Equilibria under Incomplete Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 323-350, July.
• Huizinga, H.P. & Demirgüç-Kunt, A., 1995, "Barriers to portfolio investment in emerging stock markets," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 0c9ceacb-4d49-47ea-bbce-2.
• Michael Peters, 1995, "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-95-03, Aug.
• Alvaro Forteza, 1995, "Multiple Equilibria in the Welfare State," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), Department of Economics - dECON, number 0395, Aug.
• Williamson, S.D., 1995, "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 95-01.
• Rahi, Rohit, 1995, "Partially revealing rational expectations equilibria with nominal assets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 24, issue 2, pages 137-146.
• Hoff, Karla & Lyon, Andrew B., 1995, "Non-leaky buckets: Optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 58, issue 3, pages 365-390, November.
• Eggerstedt, Harald & Hall, Rebecca Brideau & Van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1995, "Measuring capital flight: A case study of Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, volume 23, issue 2, pages 211-232, February.
• De Meza, D. & Southey, C., 1995, "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Enterpreneurship," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9502.
• Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1995, "Tax Evasion, Social Customs and Optimal Auditing," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9508.
• Michele Boldrin & Lawrence J. Christiano & Jonas D. M. Fisher, 1995, "Asset pricing lessons for modeling business cycles," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, number 95-11.
• Michele Boldrin & Lawrence J. Christiano & Jonas D. M. Fisher, 1995, "Asset pricing lessons for modeling business cycles," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, number 560.
• D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1995, "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a43.
• Baliga, S., 1995, "The Not-So-Secret Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation," Papers, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals, number 201.
• Suarez,J. & Sussman,O., 1995, "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9518.
• Goerke, L. & Holler, M.J., 1995, "Strike Ballots in a Model with Private Information," Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre, University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics, number 81.
• Gaudet, G. & Lasserre, P. & Long, N.V., 1995, "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9515.
• Dionne,G. & Fluet,C., 1995, "Incentives in Multi-period Regulation and Procurement:a Graphical Analysis," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9516.
• Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 1995, "Indirect Monitoring and Optimal Corruption," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 52, Apr.
• Ellingsen, Tore, 1995, "Price Signals Quality. The Case of One-Sided Asymmetric Information," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 60, Jul.
• Nilsen, T., 1995, "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1995_032.
• Shin-ichi Fukuda, 1995, "Moral Hazard in an Insurance Market and the Optimum Quantity of Money," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a304, Jan.

1994

• Psacharopoulos, George, 1994, "Returns to investment in education: A global update," World Development, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 9, pages 1325-1343, September.
• Bruno Cassiman, 1994, "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers of Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven, number 699341.
• Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1994, "Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9407.
• Hindriks, J., 1994, "Income Tax Compliance: The No-Commitment Game," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 149.
• Heracles M. Polemarchakis & G. Seccia, 1994, "A Role for Monetary Policy When Prices Reveal Information: An Example," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00607666.
• Fukao, Kyoji & 深尾, 京司 & フカオ, キョウジ, 1994, "Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a299, Oct.
• Mody, Ashoka & Yilmaz, Kamil & DEC, 1994, "Is there persistence in the growth of manufactured exports? Evidence from newly industrializing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1276, Mar.
• Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Feyzioglu, Tarhan N. & DEC, 1994, "Is demand for polluting goods manageable? an econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1309, Jun.
• Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo & DEC, 1994, "The new wave of private capital inflows : push or pull?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1312, Jun.
• Oks, Daniel & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1994, "Mexico after the debt crisis : is growth sustainable?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1378, Nov.
• Angelina Keil, 1994, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1994," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 67, issue 10, pages 558-559, October.
• Angelina Keil, 1994, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1993," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 67, issue 1, pages 19-20, January.
• Angelina Keil, 1994, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1994," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 67, issue 4, pages 209-211, April.
• Angelina Keil, 1994, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1994," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 67, issue 7, pages 393-394, July.
• Snower, Dennis J., 1994, "The Low-Skill, Bad-Job Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 999, Sep.
• A Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994, "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CEPR Financial Markets Paper, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX., number 0043, Jan.
• Forges, Françoise, 1994, "Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1994007, Feb.
• Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1994, "Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crisis: A reassessment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 2, pages 263-285, August.
• Faini, Riccardo, 1994, "Export supply, capacity and relative prices," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 1, pages 81-100, October.
• Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994, "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9409.
• Che, Y.K. & Gale, I.,, 1994, "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9415.
• Gigler, F, 1994, "Self-Enforcing Voluntary Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 32, issue 2, pages 224-240, DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/24912.
• Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 1994, "Sequential Location Equilibria Under Incomplete Information," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 94s-20, Nov.
• Philip T. Hoffman & Gilles Postel-Vinay & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1994, "What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 719, Oct.
• FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994044, Sep.
• FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994058, Oct.
• POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles & SECCIA, Giulio, 1994, "A Role for Monetary Policy when Prices reveal Information : An Example," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994074, Dec.
• Luis Corchon & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin, 1994, "Robust implementation under alternative information structures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 159-171, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716619.
• Mark Shroder, 1994, "A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution, with some implications for fiscal federalism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 217-224, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716622.
• Fredrik Andersson, 1994, "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 251-274, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716625.
• Sanjeev Goyal, 1994, "On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 79-102, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716615.
• Gordon, R.H. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1994, "Why is capital so immobile internationally? : Possible explanations and implications for capital income taxation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1994-63.
• de Bijl, P.W.J., 1994, "Moral hazard and noisy information disclosure," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1994-5.
• Alvaro Forteza, 1994, "On the Political Economy of the Welfare State," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers), Department of Economics - dECON, number 0594, Dec.
• Bruno Cassiman, 1994, "Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 263, Oct, revised Dec 1997.
• Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1994, "Was Prometheus unbound by chance? Risk, diversification and growth," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 98, Nov.
• Gordon, R.H. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1994, "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally?: Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," Working Papers, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan, number 358.
• Lewis, T. & Poitevin, M., 1994, "Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9414.