Bluff and Reputation
This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when facing opponents having uncertainty, may allow a player to build a reputation, but the importance of the phenomena depends upon the communication structure.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9608. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.