Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not reach a threshold set by the seller of the good. We characterize the distributions of players' private values that can support a symmetric equilibrium in continuous piecewise-linear strategies, and we calculate these strategies. Allowing the seller to charge an entry fee before players make their private contributions, we show these piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies maximize the seller's expected profit over all incentive compatible selling mechanisms.
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Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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