Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game
We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria-those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c, at which point they become flat. We show piecewise-linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923|