IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v7y2007i1n36.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Panaccione Luca

    (Luiss Guido Carli)

Abstract

In this paper, we study a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral hazard and multiple consumption goods. We consider two different market structures: contingent commodity markets on the one hand, and financial plus spot commodity markets on the other hand. We propose a competitive equilibrium concept for each market structure. We first verify that it is possible to decentralize constrained efficient allocations as equilibria with contingent markets. Subsequently, we characterize the conditions which prevent constrained efficient allocations from being decentralized as equilibria with financial markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Panaccione Luca, 2007. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:36
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1358
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1358
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1935-1704.1358?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thibaut Mastrolia, 2017. "Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions," Working Papers hal-01504473, HAL.
    2. Thibaut Mastrolia, 2017. "Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions," Papers 1706.01254, arXiv.org.
    3. Bisin, A. & Geanakoplos, J.D. & Gottardi, P. & Minelli, E. & Polemarchakis, H., 2011. "Markets and contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 279-288.
    4. Alessandro Fedele & Luca Panaccione, 2020. "Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 223-241, July.
    5. Alessandro Fedele & Luca Panaccione, 2015. "Pay package reshuffling and managerial incentives: A principal-agent analysis," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS28, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.