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Future Design

Author

Listed:
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

Abstract

Members of future generations are yet unborn. Therefore they cannot participate in markets and cannot vote in democratic elections. This paper surveys a number of articles that incorporate future generations in current decision-making. Consider the Demeny voting system that allows parents to vote as proxies for their children. In an experiment, the parents did not always vote in their children's interest and people who voted for younger generations under a normal voting system did not necessarily vote for them. These outcomes undermine the intended effect of the Demeny system. On the other hand, groups with imaginary future generation subjects in an experiment tended to choose a sustainable alternative. When people considered choosing future policies in actual practice, the current generation tended to focus upon the current unsolved problems, whereas the imaginary future generation tended to create original policies for future generations.

Suggested Citation

  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2017. "Future Design," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 68(1), pages 33-45, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:68:y:2017:i:1:p:33-45
    DOI: 10.15057/28328
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    File URL: https://hit-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2045228/files/keizaikenkyu06801033.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2019. "Future Design," Working Papers SDES-2019-5, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jun 2019.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P41 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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