Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry with information asymmetry and learning
We study a market with entrepreneurial and workers entry where both entrepreneurs' abilities and workers' qualities are private information. We develop an Agent-Based Computable model to mimic the mechanisms described in a previous analytical model (Boadway and Sato 2011). Then, we introduce the possibility that agents may learn over time about abilities and qualities of other agents, by means of Bayesian inference over informative signals. We show how such different set of assumptions affects the optimality of second-best tax and subsidy policies. While with no information it is optimal to have a subsidy to labour and a simultaneous tax on entrepreneurs to curb excessive entry, with learning a subsidy-only policy can be optimal as the detrimental effects of excessive entrepreneurial entry are (partly or totally) compensated by surplus-increasing faster learning.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2017|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: C/ Inca Garcilaso, s/n 41092 Seville|
Phone: +34 954 48 8318
Fax: +34 954 48 8300
Web page: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipt:taxref:201701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publication Officer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.