Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in a Dynamic Insurance Market
We provide a two-period model of competition in insurance market under incomplete information. Each agent, together with his initial insurer, learns about his type through accidents, but other insurers may not, depending on informational structures. We show that (i) keeping information about accidents claims private is welfare-improving, (ii) such a policy does not jeopardize the existence of an equilibrium, despite adverse selection arises endogenously, and (iii) this equilibrium exhibits both bonus and malus.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.|
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