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Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Koray, Semih
  • Saglam, Ismail

Abstract

We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.

Suggested Citation

  • Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 1997. "Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets," MPRA Paper 4459, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4459
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4459/1/MPRA_paper_4459.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-134, January.
    2. Koray, Semih & Sertel, Murat R., 1990. "Pretend-but-perform regulation and limit pricing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 451-472.
    3. Vogelsang, Ingo, 1988. "A Little Paradox in the Design of Regulatory Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(3), pages 467-476, August.
    4. Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208.
    5. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    7. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    8. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    10. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
    11. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    12. Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 2005. "Learning in Bayesian Regulation," MPRA Paper 1899, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Implementation; Nash Implementation; Asymmetric Information; Oligopoly; Regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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