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Learning in Bayesian Regulation

Author

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  • Koray, Semih
  • Saglam, Ismail

Abstract

We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 2005. "Learning in Bayesian Regulation," MPRA Paper 1899, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1899
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    4. Semih Koray & Ismail Saglam, 2005. "The Need for Regulating a Bayesian Regulator," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, July.
    5. Koray, Semih & Sertel, Murat R., 1990. "Pretend-but-perform regulation and limit pricing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 451-472.
    6. Kiefer, Nicholas M & Nyarko, Yaw, 1989. "Optimal Control of an Unknown Linear Process with Learning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 571-586, August.
    7. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    8. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Semih Koray & Ismail Saglam, 2005. "The Need for Regulating a Bayesian Regulator," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, July.
    2. Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 1997. "Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets," MPRA Paper 4459, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Principle-Agent Model; Bayesian Regulation; Incomplete Information Learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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