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Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques


  • Bertrand Villeneuve


[fre] Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques. . Nous modélisons une situation où le monopole d'assurance sait mieux estimer les risques que les assurés eux-mêmes. Nous donnons une caractérisation complète des équilibres de ce jeu de signaux multidimensionnels. Nous les comparons avec les prédictions des modèles classiques d'antisélection. Nous faisons une analyse de la valeur de l'information lorsque la discrimination est permise. [eng] Informed insurance monopoly and risk discrimination. . We model a situation where a monopolistic insurer is better at evaluating riski­ness than the policyholders. We characterize the equilibria of the corresponding multidimensional signaling game. We compare the predictions with those of adverse selection models. We give results on the value of information when discrimination is allowed.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Villeneuve, 1998. "Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 821-829.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410013

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    References listed on IDEAS

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