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Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques

Listed author(s):
  • Bertrand Villeneuve

[fre] Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques Nous modélisons une situation où le monopole d'assurance sait mieux estimer les risques que les assurés eux-mêmes. Nous donnons une caractérisation complète des équilibres de ce jeu de signaux multidimensionnels. Nous les comparons avec les prédictions des modèles classiques d'antisélection. Nous faisons une analyse de la valeur de l'information lorsque la discrimination est permise. [eng] Informed insurance monopoly and risk discrimination We model a situation where a monopolistic insurer is better at evaluating riski­ness than the policyholders. We characterize the equilibria of the corresponding multidimensional signaling game. We compare the predictions with those of adverse selection models. We give results on the value of information when discrimination is allowed.

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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410013
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 821-829

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410013
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

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