IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejpol/v15y2023i3p286-321.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua A. Blonz

Abstract

In many settings, misaligned incentives and inadequate monitoring lead employees to take self-interested actions. This paper identifies and quantifies the costs of this principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance replacement program. I show that contractors (agents) hired by the electric utility (the principal) increase their compensation by intentionally misreporting program data to authorize the replacement of nonqualified refrigerators. I estimate that each unqualified replacement reduces program benefits by $106 and saves 30 percent less electricity than replacements that follow program guidelines. The same program without a principal-agent distortion would increase program benefits by $60 per replacement.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua A. Blonz, 2023. "The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 286-321, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:286-321
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210208
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20210208
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E166342V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20210208.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20210208.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/pol.20210208?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell, 2022. "Do Two Electricity Pricing Wrongs Make a Right? Cost Recovery, Externalities, and Efficiency," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 80-110, November.
    2. Meredith Fowlie & Michael Greenstone & Catherine Wolfram, 2015. "Are the Non-monetary Costs of Energy Efficiency Investments Large? Understanding Low Take-Up of a Free Energy Efficiency Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 201-204, May.
    3. Meredith Fowlie & Michael Greenstone & Catherine Wolfram, 2015. "Are the Non-monetary Costs of Energy Efficiency Investments Large? Understanding Low Take-Up of a Free Energy Efficiency Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 201-204, May.
    4. Severin Borenstein, 2012. "The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(1), pages 67-92, Winter.
    5. Koichiro Ito, 2014. "Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 537-563, February.
    6. John List, 2020. "Non est Disputandum de Generalizability? A Glimpse into The External Validity Trial," Artefactual Field Experiments 00711, The Field Experiments Website.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Palmer, Charles & Pinchbeck, Edward W., 2019. "The energy costs of historic preservation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Jacobsen, Grant D., 2015. "Do energy prices influence investment in energy efficiency? Evidence from energy star appliances," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 94-106.
    3. Frondel, Manuel & Kussel, Gerhard & Sommer, Stephan, 2019. "Heterogeneity in the price response of residential electricity demand: A dynamic approach for Germany," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 119-134.
    4. Ensieh Shojaeddini & Ben Gilbert, 2023. "Heterogeneity in the Rebound Effect: Evidence from Efficient Lighting Subsidies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(1), pages 173-217, January.
    5. John A. List & Robert D. Metcalfe & Michael K. Price & Florian Rundhammer, 2017. "Harnessing Policy Complementarities to Conserve Energy: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 23355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Vesterberg, Mattias, 2018. "The effect of price on electricity contract choice," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 59-70.
    7. Gosnell, Greer & McCoy, Daire, 2023. "Market failures and willingness to accept smart meters: Experimental evidence from the UK," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    8. Myers, Erica & Puller, Steven & West, Jeremy, 2019. "Effects of Mandatory Energy Efficiency Disclosure in Housing Markets," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt26f4n98g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    9. Lanot, Gauthier & Vesterberg, Mattias, 2017. "An empirical model of the decision to switch between electricity price contracts," Umeå Economic Studies 951, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    10. Christian Gambardella & Michael Pahle & Wolf-Peter Schill, 2016. "Do Benefits from Dynamic Tariffing Rise? Welfare Effects of Real-Time Pricing under Carbon-Tax-Induced Variable Renewable Energy Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1621, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Stefan Lamp & Mario Samano, 2023. "(Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(1), pages 195-229.
    12. Ben Gilbert & Jacob LaRiviere & Kevin Novan, 2019. "Additionality, Mistakes, and Energy Efficiency Investment," Working Papers 2019-01, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    13. Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu & Tamokoué Kamga, Paul-Hervé, 2019. "Energy Performance Certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: A theoretical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(S1).
    14. Meredith Fowlie & Michael Greenstone & Catherine Wolfram, 2018. "Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(3), pages 1597-1644.
    15. Lundmark, Robert, 2022. "Time-adjusted transaction costs for energy renovations for single-family house-owners," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    16. Salvo, Alberto, 2018. "Flexible fuel vehicles, less flexible minded consumers: Price information experiments at the pump," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 194-221.
    17. Palm, Alvar & Lantz, Björn, 2020. "Information dissemination and residential solar PV adoption rates: The effect of an information campaign in Sweden," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    18. Gilbert, Ben & LaRiviere, Jacob & Novan, Kevin, 2022. "Uncertainty and additionality in energy efficiency programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    19. Häckel, Björn & Pfosser, Stefan & Tränkler, Timm, 2017. "Explaining the energy efficiency gap - Expected Utility Theory versus Cumulative Prospect Theory," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 414-426.
    20. Drivas, Kyriakos & Rozakis, Stelios & Xesfingi, Sofia, 2019. "The effect of house energy efficiency programs on the extensive and intensive margin of lower-income households’ investment behavior," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 607-615.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L68 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:286-321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.