IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aerins/v4y2022i4p459-72.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Getting Permission

Author

Listed:
  • Peicong Hu
  • Joel Sobel

Abstract

A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria, including one in which at least one expert supports the manager's favorite project. Only one outcome, the experts' most preferred equilibrium outcome, survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. We show that no sequential procedure can perform better for the manager than the experts' most preferred equilibrium and exhibit a sequential protocol that does as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Peicong Hu & Joel Sobel, 2022. "Getting Permission," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 459-472, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:4:p:459-72
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210494
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aeri.20210494
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aeri.20210494.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aeri.20210494.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/aeri.20210494?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:4:p:459-72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.