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Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure

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  • Xue, Hao
  • Zheng, Ronghuo

Abstract

This paper examines how a firm adjusts its disclosure quality in response to technological innovations that improve investors' private information. We show that more precise private information can endogenously amplify supply shocks and, hence, increase noise-driven (or non-fundamental) price volatility. We study how the firm reacts to such changes and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm improves its disclosure quality when investors are informed with better private signals. We then apply our model to study investors' private word-of-mouth communication. Our analysis highlights a “dark side” of word-of-mouth communication and a call for better public disclosure even if private communication is assumed to be unbiased and truthful. We provide empirical predictions regarding how price volatility, market depth, and firms’ disclosure qualities would change as technological innovations, such as social media, facilitate information sharing among investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Xue, Hao & Zheng, Ronghuo, 2021. "Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:71:y:2021:i:1:s0165410120300653
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101363
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    2. Xu, Weijun & Pan, Shiliang & Ji, Yucheng & Zhao, Qi, 2023. "Public disclosure with information sharing in financial market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public disclosure; Private information; Word-of-mouth communication; Price volatility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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