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Insider, outsider and information heterogeneity

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  • Zhou, Deqing
  • Wang, Wenjie

Abstract

In financial markets, although the insider has superior information relative to the outsider, the outsider may possess some information the insider can’t precisely observe. This work investigates the impacts of information heterogeneity between the insider and outsider based on Foster and Viswanathan (1994). It shows that the less the insider knows about the outsider, the more she commits to aggressive trading, enabling her to earn more at the cost of outsider’s losses. Meanwhile, information heterogeneity improves the liquidity and benefits noise traders.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Deqing & Wang, Wenjie, 2020. "Insider, outsider and information heterogeneity," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:53:y:2020:i:c:s1062940820300905
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2020.101193
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider; Outsider; Information heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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