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Disclosure with unknown expertise

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  • Li, Run

Abstract

We study a disclosure game in which a sender privately knows how much information she possesses and can disclose verifiable information to persuade a receiver to provide a higher reward. The receiver may attribute any imprecise disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable information. We show that the most unfavorable possibility contained in information possessed by the sender will be fully revealed to the receiver.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Run, 2021. "Disclosure with unknown expertise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:208:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003396
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110062
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jung, Wo & Kwon, Yk, 1988. "Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 146-153.
    2. Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2017. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 690-713, March.
    3. Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
    4. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    6. Dye, Ra, 1985. "Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 123-145.
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    Cited by:

    1. Suárez-Gargallo, Carlos & Zaragoza-Sáez, Patrocinio, 2023. "A comprehensive bibliometric study of the balanced scorecard," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure game; Expertise;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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