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Talking to influence

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  • Dell’Era, Michele

Abstract

I study expert advice when an expert benefits from being perceived as influential. A paradox arises: the stronger is a client’s expected need of advice, the worse is expert advice. The reason is that the expert’s benefit from influence engenders an incentive to misreport information which makes quality of expert advice depend negatively on the client’s expected need of advice.

Suggested Citation

  • Dell’Era, Michele, 2020. "Talking to influence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301403
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109190
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2006. "Reputational cheap talk," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 155-175, March.
    2. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
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    4. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
    5. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-179, March.
    6. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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