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Contentious Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Hege, Ulrich
  • Viala, Pascale

Abstract

This paper offers an explanation of rationally incomplete contracts, where incompleteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a two-sided moral hazard relationship, in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex-ante efficient. This happens through costly legal dispute which arises when contract terms are missing for undesirable outcomes. We show that an optimal contract needs only to specify the obligation for the more litigious party to assure a certain output level – the threshold between foreseen and unforeseen contingencies – and a linear sharing rule for the foreseen contingencies. If litigation reveals some information about the effort levels of the agents, less costly dispute is typically needed and the allocation will improve.

Suggested Citation

  • Hege, Ulrich & Viala, Pascale, 1998. "Contentious Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1910
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    14. repec:cep:stitep:313 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    burning money; contract law; Incomplete Contracts; Team Production; unforeseen contingencies;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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