Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders
We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. The buyers have the same ex post valuation of the object but differ in their estimates of what this value is.
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|Date of creation:||Sep 1998|
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