Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders
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Other versions of this item:
- Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 1998. "Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders," Papers 0092, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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KeywordsINFORMATION ; AUCTIONS ; LEARNING;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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