A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard
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- Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, P. & Guaitoli, D., 1998. "A Note on the Convergence to Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Moral Hazard," Working Papers 98-41, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bisin, A. & Geanakoplos, J.D. & Gottardi, P. & Minelli, E. & Polemarchakis, H., 2011.
"Markets and contracts,"
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- Alberto Bisin & John Geanakoplos & Piero Gottardi & Enrico Minelli & Heracles Polemarchakis, 2009. "Markets and Contracts," Working Papers 0915, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
- Alberto Bisin & John Geanakoplos & Piero Gottardi & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2010. "Markets and contracts," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/29, European University Institute.
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- Douglas Gale, 1992. "A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 229-255.
- Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, Piero, 1999.
"Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information,"
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- Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 1998. "Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2062, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
- Roozbeh Hosseini, 2015.
"Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market and the Role for Social Security,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(4), pages 941-984.
- Roozbeh Hosseini, 2008. "Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market and the Role for Social Security," 2008 Meeting Papers 264, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; exclusivity; competitive equilibrium;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-28 (Microeconomics)
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