Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy
Individuals exchange contracts for the deliveryof commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directlyor through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash-Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utilityfunctions are not quasi - concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1999|
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