IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Pareto improving taxes

  • Geanakoplos, John
  • Polemarchakis, H.M.
Registered author(s):

    We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities. It shows that policy makers should look for good tax packages that help everybody, rather than thinking taxes must inevitably be bad for some lobby that will oppose them.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-4068(07)00095-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 44 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 7-8 (July)
    Pages: 682-696

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:7-8:p:682-696
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. CITANNA, Alessandro & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles M. & TIRELLI, M., 2000. "The Taxation of Trades in assets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 721, HEC Paris.
    2. Snyder, Susan K., 1999. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 97-119, January.
    3. J. A. Mirrlees, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21.
    4. Geanakoplos, J. D. & Polemarchakis, H. M., 1990. "Observability and optimality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 153-165.
    5. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    6. Debreu, Gerard, 1972. "Smooth Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-15, July.
    7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Ivar Ekeland & Felix Kübler & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1999. "The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices," Working Papers hal-00598229, HAL.
    8. POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles M. & CHIAPPORI, P. A. & KUBLER, F. & EKELAND, I., 2000. "The identification of preferences from equilibrium prices under uncertainty," Les Cahiers de Recherche 689, HEC Paris.
    9. Peter A. Diamond, 1973. "Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 526-538, Autumn.
    10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 241-261.
    11. Alberto Bisin & John Geanakoplos & Piero Gottardi & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2010. "Markets and contracts," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/29, European University Institute.
      • Alberto Bisin & John Geanakoplos & Piero Gottardi & Enrico Minelli & Heracles Polemarchakis, 2009. "Markets and Contracts," Working Papers 0915, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    12. Debreu, Gerard, 1976. "Smooth Preferences: A Corrigendum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 831-32, July.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    14. Kenneth Arrow, 1970. "Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Public Output, pages 1-30 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Atsushi Kajii & Antonio Villanacci & Alessandro Citanna, 1998. "Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 495-521.
    16. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
    17. P. A. Diamond, 1975. "A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule," Working papers 146, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    18. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
    19. Andrés Carvajal, . "Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," Borradores de Economia 231, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    20. DEBREU, Gérard, . "Economies with a finite set of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 67, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    21. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    22. Guesnerie, Roger, 1977. "On the direction of tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 179-202, April.
    23. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June.
    24. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:7-8:p:682-696. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.