At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained Pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a Pareto improvement in welfare.
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