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Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite

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Abstract

Avec la règle de la responsabilité sans faute, un agent potentiellement insolvable est incité à prendre insuffisammant de précautions dans la pratique d'activités imposant des risques à des tiers. La règle plus courante de la responsabilité pour faute peut pallier ce problème puisqu'elle conditionne la responsabilité légale sur le comportement de prévention de l'agent, observé ex post. Cet article généralise l'analyse de la responsabilité pour faute au cas où la cour n'obtient qu'une information imparfaite sur le comportement de l'agent. En particulier, je montre que le critère juridique de la prépondérance de preuve est compatible avec l'efficacité incitative. Under the tort law strict liability rule, a potentially judgment proof agent will take suboptimal care in the conduct of risk generating activities, thereby imposing excessive risks on third parties. The more common negligence rule can alleviate this problem by conditioning liability on the agent's actual level of care, observed ex post. This paper extends the analysis of the negligence rule to the case where courts can obtain only imperfect information on the level of care. In particular, I show that the legal practice concerning standards of proof is compatible with incentive efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Fluet, 1998. "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9802, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. BOYER, Marcel, 1995. "Environmental Protection Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability," Cahiers de recherche 9557, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-622, December.
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    5. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 379-402, August.
    6. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Single Activity Accidents," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 107-164, January.
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    8. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
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    11. Park, Eun-Soo, 1995. "Incentive Contracting under Limited Liability," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 477-490, Fall.
    12. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1992. "Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1137-1170, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claude Fluet, 2003. "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 1-49, March.
    2. Fluet, Claude, 2010. "Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-9, March.
    3. Claude Fluet, 2002. "Assurance de responsabilité et aléa moral dans les régimes de responsabilité objective et pour faute," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(6), pages 845-861.
    4. Fluet, Claude, 2010. "L’économie de la preuve judiciaire," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 86(4), pages 451-486, décembre.
    5. Sandrine SPAETER, 2002. "Principe de precaution et comportements preventifs des firmes face aux risques environnementaux," Working Papers of BETA 2002-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2000. "Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 120, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    negligence rule; strict liability rule; moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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