Non-Monetary Collusion and Optimal Use of Information
This paper develops a theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents exchange favours. We examine the optimal use of information in a simple hierarchy. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information about agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours cannot be exchanged.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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