Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition
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- Claude Fluet & Dominique Demougin, 2001. "Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 489-496.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998.
"Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,"
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Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-622, December.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508.
- Xie, Jia, 2011. "Ranking of signals in multitask agency models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 82-84, July.
- Georges Dionne & Genevieve Gauthier & Nadia Ouertani & Nabil Tahani, 2011. "Heterogeneous Basket Options Pricing Using Analytical Approximations," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 15(1-2), pages 47-85, March - J.
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"The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 287-307.
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- Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2011.
"Limited liability and the risk–incentive relationship,"
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Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 97-110, March.
- Budde, Jörg & Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 232, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- JÃ¶rg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002.
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02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-18, CIRANO.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1501-1509.
- Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
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"The Effect of Childcare and Early Education Arrangements on Developmental Outcomes of Young Children,"
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- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2000. "Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 120, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Fluet, Claude, 2010. "Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-9, March.
More about this item
Keywordsagency problem; information systems; likelihood ratio; mean preserving spread criterion; integral criterion;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-03-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-1999-03-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1999-03-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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