Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis
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- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
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More about this item
KeywordsPrincipal-agent; moral hazard; audits; prudence; likelihood ratio distribution; third-order stochastic dominance; Principal-agent; aléa moral; audits; prudence; distribution du ratio de vraisemblance; dominance stochastique du troisième ordre;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-03-14 (All new papers)
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