Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving spread condition on the likelihood ratio distributions.
Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: November 10, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000|
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- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998.
"Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-, December.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
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