Incentive Contracts And Total Factor Productivity
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Demougin, Dominique M. & Bental, Benjamin, 2004. "Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity," Papers 2004,41, Humboldt University of Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE).
- Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity," Cahiers de recherche 0325, CIRPEE.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998.
"Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-622, December.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Shi, Shouyong, 1998. "Search for a Monetary Propagation Mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 314-352, August.
- Edward C. Prescott & Stephen L. Parente, 1999. "Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1216-1233, December.
- Prescott, Edward C, 1998. "Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 525-551, August.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999.
"Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1998. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?"," Working Papers 98007, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Building blocks for barriers to riches," Staff Report 288, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1981.
"Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2011.
"The fixed wage puzzle: Why profit sharing is so hard to implement,"
Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 104-106, February.
- Jerger, Jürgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 441, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
- Jürgen Jerger & Jochen Michaelis, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle : Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," Working Papers 283, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
- Jürgen Jerger & Jochen Michaelis, 2010. "The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201013, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-009, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Abián García-Rodríguez & Fernando Sánchez-Losada, 2014. "R&D poverty traps," UB Economics Working Papers 2014/307, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics.
- Dominique Demougin & Anja Schöttner, 2010. "Technology adoption under hidden information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(1), pages 1-18, May.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May.
- Hernando Zuleta, 2015. "Getting Growth Accounting Right," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 013814, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Carlos Lamarche, 2013.
"Industry-wide work rules and productivity: evidence from Argentine union contract data,"
IZA Journal of Labor & Development,
Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, December.
- Lamarche, Carlos, 2013. "Industry-Wide Work Rules and Productivity: Evidence from Argentine Union Contract Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7673, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Stephane Straub, 2011.
"Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature,"
Journal of Development Studies,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(5), pages 683-708.
- Stephane Straub, 2007. "Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature," ESE Discussion Papers 178, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Straub, Stephane, 2008. "Infrastructure and development : a critical appraisal of the macro level literature," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4590, The World Bank.
- Bental, Benjamin & Demougin, Dominique, 2010. "Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 443-456, March.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "On Adverse Selection of Technologies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(2), pages 343-355, June.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:47:y:2006:i:3:p:1033-1055. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.