IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Deliberations with Double-Sided Information

  • Ulrich Doraszelski
Registered author(s):

    Two players need to agree to adopt a certain option, otherwise the status quo is maintained. The correct choice depends of an unknown state variable. While both players would like the correct choice to be made, their relative concern with the two types of mistakes may differ and is private information. Each player observes a private signal that is correlated with the state variable. Before reaching the final decision through simultaneous vote, players communicate by expressing a personal non-binding option. We provide a succinct characterization of the equilibria. Although truthful communication may take place in equilibrium, the players' private information about the state of the world is not fully revealed. In fact, the sole role of communication is to provide a means for each player to decide how to vote when her private signal conflicts with her relative concern. Our calculations show that communication increases ex-ante utility. When only one player may speak, we show that their ex-ante utility is independent on who is selected as a speaker even if the quality of information radically differs among players.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1276.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1276R.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Sep 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1276
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
    Phone: 847/491-3527
    Fax: 847/491-2530
    Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Email:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
    2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
    3. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Matthews, Steven A, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-69, May.
    5. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    6. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
    7. Dekel, E. & Piccione, M., 1999. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Papers 3-99, Tel Aviv.
    8. Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2004. "Delegating Decisions to Experts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages S311-S335, February.
    9. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1999. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Working Papers 9904, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    10. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-43, November.
    11. Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    12. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1991. "Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 183-220, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1276. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.