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The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games

  • Nyarko, Y.

Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision-theoretically equivalent formulations of the type space. These different formulations correspond to different ways of encoding tha realizations of randomizations in the type of a player. Solution concepts, assumptions or paradoxes in games should be independent of the formulation of the game used. I refer to this axiom as TIGER, for "Type Independence among Games which are equivalently Re-formulated".

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9381/RR98-12.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 98-12.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-12
Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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  1. John H. Nachbar, 1995. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 9504001, EconWPA, revised 14 Feb 1996.
  2. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
  4. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
  5. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, EconWPA.
  6. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  7. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
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