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The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games


  • Nyarko, Y.


Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision-theoretically equivalent formulations of the type space. These different formulations correspond to different ways of encoding tha realizations of randomizations in the type of a player. Solution concepts, assumptions or paradoxes in games should be independent of the formulation of the game used. I refer to this axiom as TIGER, for "Type Independence among Games which are equivalently Re-formulated".

Suggested Citation

  • Nyarko, Y., 1998. "The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games," Working Papers 98-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-12

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
    2. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
    3. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    5. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Discussion Papers 1177, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
    7. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations


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