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Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning

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Listed:
  • Matthew O. Jackson

    (California Institute of Technology)

  • Ehud Kalai

    (Northwestern University)

  • Rann Smorodinsky

    (Technion)

Abstract

Bayesian Statisticians, decision theorists, and game theorists often use Bayesian representations to describe the probability distribution governing the evolution of a stochastic process. Generally, however, one given distribution has infinitely many different Bayesian representations. This paper identifies natural, endogenous representations whose component distributions are learnable and follow patterns. Any given distribution that satisfies an asymptotic mixing condition has a unique, up to an equivalence class, natural Bayesian representation which can be obtained by conditioning on the tail-field of the process. This result follows a parallel to de Finetti's theorem, but with exchangeability weakened to asymptotic mixing which admits many more applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711002
    Note: Type of Document - postscript; prepared on gateway e 3100; to print on postscript; pages: 27 ; figures: none. comments welcome
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nyarko, Y., 1998. "The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games," Working Papers 98-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    patterns; asymptotic mixing; types; Bayesian learning; stochastic processes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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