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Multiproject team assignments

Author

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  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia)

Abstract

We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project.

Suggested Citation

  • Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999. "Multiproject team assignments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 231-254.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:231-254
    Note: Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 22 December 1998
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    Keywords

    Allocation problem; teams; incentive mechanisms; monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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