Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information
This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
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