Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2000

• Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000, "On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 223.
• Gehrlein, W. & Valognes, F., 2000, "Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 224.
• Tungodden, B., 2000, "Responsibility and Redistribution: the Case of First Best Taxation," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 14/00.
• Jaramillo, F. & Kempf, H. & Moizeau, F., 2000, "Inequality and Club Formation," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 2000.36.
• Calvert, R. & Fox, J., 2000, "Effective Parties in a Model of Repeated Legislative Bargaining," Papers, Western Sydney - School of Business And Technology, number 211.
• Hervé Crès, 2000, "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00598173, Jul.
• Hervé Crès, 2000, "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01064883, Jul.
• Frisell, Lars, 2000, "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 355, Feb.
• Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Larsson, Bo, 2000, "Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Money," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2000:11, Sep.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2000, "Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2000-07, Nov.
• Reiko Gotoh & Naoki Yoshihara, 2000, "A Class of Fair Distribution Rules a la Rawls and Sen," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a389, Feb.
• Naoki Yoshihara, 2000, "Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions in Production Economies with Unequal Skills," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a396, Oct.
• Naoki Yoshihara, 2000, "On Effcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a397, Oct.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2000, "Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 2, Nov.
• Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000, "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 3, Dec.
• Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000, "Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 4, Dec.
• Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000, "Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 5, Dec.
• Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000, "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, number 191/2000, revised 25 Sep 2001.
• Annick Laruelle & Mika WidgrÚn, 2000, "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, volume 17, pages 67-84.
• Iñigo Iturbe Ormaetxe & Carmen Beviá, 2000, "Redistribution And Subsidies For Higher Education," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 2000-15, Jun.
• AMBEC, Steve & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000, "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2000-08.
• BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000, "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2000-09.
• Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000, "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 2000-08.
• Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2000, "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 2000-09.
• Ruvin Gekker, 2000, "On the Axiomatic Ranking of Opportunity Sets in a Logical framework," Working Papers, National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics, number 0044, revised 2000.

1999

• Amartya Sen, 1999, "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 3, pages 349-378, June.
• Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999, "Inequality, Market Imperfections, and Collective Action Problems," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley, number qt6hg27862, Sep.
• Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999, "Inequality, Market Imperfections, and Collective Action Problems," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley, number qt6hg27862, Sep.
• Wulf Gaertner & Jochen Jungeilges, 1999, "Evaluation via Extended Orderings: Empirical Findings from West and East," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 42, Mar.
• Kevin Roberts, 1999, "Dynamic Voting in Clubs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 367, Jan.
• Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Roy Gardner & Jürgen von Hagen & Claudia Keser, 1999, "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 99s-33, Oct.
• Widgrén, Mika, 1999, "Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2207, Aug.
• Sibert, Anne, 1999, "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2328, Dec.
• Arnsperger, Christian & Varoufakis, Yannis, 1999, "Beyond Altruism, Duty or Collusion. Introducting Solidarity into Economics," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1999030, Jan.
• Suzumura, Kotaro, 1999, "Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 109, issue 455, pages 204-220, April.
• Sjostrom, Tomas, 1999, "Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 2, pages 337-352, January.
• Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1999, "Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 2, pages 299-330, May.
• Roberts, Kevin, 1999, "Dynamic voting in clubs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19349, Jan.
• Kroll, Yoram & Davidovitz, Leima, 1999, "Choices in egalitarian distribution: inequality aversion versus risk aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 6582, Mar.
• Gaertner, Wulf & Jungeilges, Jochen, 1999, "Evaluation via extended orderings: empirical findings from west and east," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 6583, Mar.
• Hindriks, J., 1999, "Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9915.
• Hollard, G. & Luchini, S., 1999, "Theories du choix social et representations: analyse d'une enquete sur le tourisme cert en Camargue," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99b06.
• Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999, "Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict," Papers, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza, number 22.
• Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999, "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza, number 23.
• Tungodden, B., 1999, "Hammond Equity: a Generalization," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 20/99.
• Tungodden, B., 1999, "Norms and Informational Environments in Social Choices," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 22/99.
• Tungodden, B., 1999, "Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option?," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 4/99.
• Chateauneuf, A. & Wilthien, P.-H., 1999, "Inverse Stochastic Dominance and Yaari's Model," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999-95.
• Chateauneuf, A. & Gajdos, T. & Wilthien, P.-H., 1999, "The Principle of Strong Kiminishing Transfer," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999-96.
• Wilthien, P.-H., 1999, "Downside-Mindedness," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999-97.
• Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999, "Characterizations of Consenquentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a365, Mar.
• Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999, "Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a366, Mar.
• Kotaro Suzumura, 1999, "Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a382, Oct.
• Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999, "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5246, Jan.
• Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 99-20, Jul.
• Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 99-21, Mar.
• Barbara Krug, 1999, "On Custom in Economics: The Case of Humanism and Trade Regimes," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 155, issue 3, pages 405-405, September.
• Alberto Cassone & Carla Marchese, 1999, "The Economics of Religious Indulgences," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 155, issue 3, pages 429-429, September.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999, "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 009.
• Laurence Kranich, 1999, "Measuring Opportunity Inequality with Monetary Transfers," Discussion Papers, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics, number 99-02.
• Kapsalis, Constantine, 1999, "Employer Support for Employee Voluntarism," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 26141, Jan.
• Michel Truchon, 1999, "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, volume 75, issue 1, pages 189-214.
• Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 1999, "A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration," Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, number 20, Nov, revised Nov 1999.
• Donald G. Saari & Maria M. Tataru, 1999, "The likelihood of dubious election outcomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 2, pages 345-363.
• Efe A. Ok & Lin Zhou, 1999, "Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 3, pages 671-687.
• François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 1999, "Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 583-595.
• Wulf Gaertner & Yongsheng Xu, 1999, "On the structure of choice under different external references," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 609-620.
• Rajat Deb & Shinji Ohseto, 1999, "Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 685-689.
• Dirk Van de gaer & Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1999, "Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 1, pages 35-55.
• Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999, "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 1, pages 57-72.
• Michel Le Breton & Peter J. Coughlan, 1999, "A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 2, pages 153-160.
• Liqun Liu & Guoqiang Tian, 1999, "A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 205-218.
• Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 4, pages 381-387.
• John A. Weymark, 1999, "Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 4, pages 389-393.
• Kotaro Suzumura, 1999, "Consequences, opportunities, and procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 16, issue 1, pages 17-40.
• Gilles, R.P., 1999, "Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-47.
• Pranab Bardhan and Maitreesh Ghatak., 1999, "Inequality, Market Imperfections, and Collective Action Problems," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number C99-108, Sep.
• Carles Boix, 1999, "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 367, Jan.
• Peter J. Hammond, 1999, "Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 99021, Sep.
• Gerhard Glomm & Roger Lagunoff, 1999, "A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901002, Jan.
• Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999, "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902001, Feb, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Sell, Friedrich L., 1999, "Die EWWU als Club: Positive und normative Implikationen für den Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Reformstaaten," Working Papers in Economics, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group, number 1999,4.

1998

• Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1998, "A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Working Papers, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, number 399, Jul.
• Robert G. Chambers & Rolf Färe, 1998, "Translation homotheticity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 3, pages 629-641.
• Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 1998, "Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 147-162.
• James A. Dearden, 1998, "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 189-198.
• HervÊ CrÉs & Yves Balasko, 1998, "Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 313-334.
• Thomas Brenner, 1998, "Can evolutionary algorithms describe learning processes?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 8, issue 3, pages 271-283.
• Walter Bossert & David Donaldson & Charles Blackorby, 1998, "Uncertainty and critical-level population principles," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-20.
• Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998, "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 15, issue 2, pages 211-236.
• Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 1998, "Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent," POLIS Working Papers, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS, number 1, Dec.
• Eduardo Ley & Mark F.J. Steel, 1998, "A model of management teams," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 19, issue 6, pages 355-363, DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199809)19:6.
• Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev, 1998, "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9804001, Apr.
• Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1998, "A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9808001, Aug.
• Leech, D., 1998, "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 510.
• Joaquín Pérez, 1998, "A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences," Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo, Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá., number 1/00, revised 2000.
• Nicolo, A., 1998, "Nash Implementation in Truthful Strategies, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency on the Restricted Domain of Leontief Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 418.98.
• Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017, "Single peakedness and coalition proofness," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 290, Apr.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 346, Jan.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998, "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 4, pages 952-974, November.
• Plott, Charles & Hung, Angela, 1998, "Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity Rewarding Institutions," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1051, Dec.
• BARBERA, Salvador & MASCHLER, Michael & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998022, Apr.
• Cechlárová, Katarína & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998, "Stability in one-sided matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 4158, Jul.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998, "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998001, Jan.
• Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998, "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-10.
• Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998, "Voting Procedures," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-30.
• Yvon, PESQUEUX & Jean-François, VAUTIER, 1998, "Evaluation subjective de la perception d’une activité par une approche ergonomique," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 642, Feb.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 66, issue 6, pages 1353-1388, November.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 114, Jan.
• Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998, "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 3, pages 331-346, August.
• Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998, "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 1, pages 91-112, April.
• Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. outside ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19360, Jan.
• J. E. Peris & M-C. Sánchez, 1998, "Fixed agenda social choice correspondences," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 98-11.
• Svendsen, G.T., 1998, "Transitio to Market Economy Eastern Europe: The case of Lobbyism in Russia," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 98-1.
• Svendsen, G.T., 1998, "Social Capital, Economic Growth and Transition Economies," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 98-2.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1816.
• Eric Maskin, 1998, "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1829.
• Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998, "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1837.
• Papai, S., 1998, "Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules," Papers, Koc University, number 1998/02.
• Peris, J.E. & Sanchez, M.C., 1998, "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9811.
• Helpman, E. & Persson, T., 1998, "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 08-98.
• Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1998, "Competing for Endorsements," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 09-98.
• Bottom, W.P. & Eavey, C.L. & Miller, G.J. & Nicoll, J., 1998, "The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions," Washington University, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, number 98-07.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 1998, "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 1998-01, Jun.
• Suzumura Kotaro, 1998, "Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a341, Jan.
• Paterson, Iain, 1998, "Vote Weighting in the European Union," East European Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 54, Jan.
• Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1998, "- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1998-05, Apr.
• Hollard Guillaume, 1998, "An Asymmetric Model of Spatial Competition," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-12, Sep.
• Truchon, Michel, 1998, "An Extension of the Concordet Criterion and Kemeny Orders," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9813.
• Dennis Halcoussis & Anton D. Lowenberg, 1998, "Local Public Goods and Jim Crow," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 154, issue 4, pages 599-599, December.
• Cardak, B.A., 1998, "Preferences Over Education Expenditure," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 623.
• MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 1998, "Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9805.
• Jinpeng Ma, 1998, "Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1230, Oct.
• Jinpeng Ma, 1998, "Stable Matchings and the Small Core in Nash Equilibrium in the College Admissions Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1247, Nov.

1997

• Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 1997, "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-date Dependent Classical Principles," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 48, issue 3, pages 267-292, September.
• Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997, "Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: A Reconsideration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1589, Mar.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997, "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1600, Mar.
• Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 1997, "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-36.
• Moulin, HervÈ & Shenker, Scott, 1997, "Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics, number 97-21.
• Barzel, Yoram, 1997, "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 4, pages 455-474, December.
• Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997, "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 237-270, August.
• Ok, Efe A., 1997, "On Opportunity Inequality Measurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 2, pages 300-329, December.
• Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997, "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 34, issue 3, pages 249-272, October.
• Demange, Gabrielle & Guesnerie, Roger, 1997, "Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 1, pages 7-17, April.
• Tomas Sjostrom, 1997, "Undominated Nash Implementaion with Collusion and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1791.
• Koray, S. & Sertel, M., 1997, "A Multiplication of Solution Concepts," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 162.
• Barzel, Y, 1997, "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-13.
• Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1997, "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1997_017.
• Kotaro Suzumura, 1997, "Consequences, Opportunities, and Procedures," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a338, Jul.
• Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997, "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 41, Feb.
• Csontos, László, 1997, "A politika tanulmányozása és a közgazdaságtan
  [The study of politics and political economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 557-568.
• Meszerics, Tamás, 1997, "Stratégiai viselkedés és bizottsági döntés
  [Strategic behaviour and committee decison]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 687-697.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1997, "Efficiency in Partnership Structures," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 552.
• Alain Chateauneuf & Michèle Cohen & Robert Kast, 1997, "Comonotone random variables in economics: A review of some results," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97032, Feb.
• Saglam, Ismail, 1997, "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 2330, May.
• Andreas Wagener, 1997, "Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems as Incomplete Social Contracts," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, number 62-97.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 257-276.
• Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1997, "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 305-333.
• Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 147-160.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1997, "Market arbitrage, social choice and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 161-198.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 303-318.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 4, pages 503-512.
• Ten Raa, T., 1997, "Club efficiency and Lindahl equilibrium," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-24.
• Matsui, Akihiko & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997, "Evolution and Interaction of Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number 97-F-26, Aug.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-03, Jun.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-04, Feb.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-05, Jan.
• Barzel, Y, 1997, "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-13.
• De Paola, M., 1997, "Welfare Measurement Under Habit Forming Tastes," University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK., number 9703.
• Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 1997, "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 97023, Mar.
• Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997, "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707008, Jul.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9705001, May, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Kirstein, Roland, 1997, "Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-04.

1996

• Salvador Barberà, 1996, "Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 9, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura, "Social Choice Re-Examined", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_3.
• Nick Baigent & Wulf Gaertner, 1996, "Never choose the uniquely largest A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249.
• Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996, "Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249, August.
• Steffen Ziss, 1996, "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 245-261, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499135.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996, "A robust theory of resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 13, issue 1, pages 1-10, January, DOI: 10.1007/BF00179093.
• Kochin, M.S. & Kochin, L.A., 1996, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 96-09.
• Segal, U., 1996, "How to Escape Dutch Books in Dynamic Choice," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9608.
• Segal, U., 1996, "Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9611.
• Perry, M. & Vincent, D.R., 1996, "The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9614.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604002, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.