Effective Parties in a Model of Repeated Legislative Bargaining
A self-enforcing equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standard legislative bargaining model demonstrates how a member of a party would overcome the temptations to violate a party's agreement to stick together on legislative matters in the absence of external enforcement. The model is robust, and realistic, in the sense that departures from the equilibrium path lead eventually to restablishment of intra-party cooperation. Thus we construe legislative politics in a way that would support either a purely preference-based equilibrium or a equilibrium in which the legislature has an internal system of party organization that influences members sometimes to vote indifferently than they would based on their myopic issue preferences alone.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.uws.edu.au/sob
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:wesybu:211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.