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Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds

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  • David Albouy

    (University of Michigan and NBER)

Abstract

In a two-party legislature, districts represented by the majority may receive greater funds if majority-party legislators have greater proposal power or disproportionately form coalitions with each other. Funding types received by districts may depend on their legislators' party identity when party preferences differ. Estimates from the United States, using fixed-effect and regression-discontinuity designs, indicate that states represented by members of Congress in the majority receive greater federal grants, especially in transportation, and defense spending. States represented by Republicans receive more for defense and transportation than those represented by Democrats; the latter receive more spending for education and urban development. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • David Albouy, 2013. "Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(1), pages 127-141, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:95:y:2013:i:1:p:127-141
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    distributional politics; legislative bargaining; federal spending; political parties; Congressional politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

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