Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis
This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.
Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 5 March 1997 / Accepted: 19 August 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058|
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