Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note
Serizawa  characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.
Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998|
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