Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2002

• Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002, "Social choice with analytic preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 19, issue 3, pages 637-657.
• Buly A Cardak, 2002, "Education Choice, Endogenous Growth and Income Distribution," Working Papers, School of Economics, La Trobe University, number 2002.03, Mar.
• Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2002, "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/9007.
• Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002, "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0206, Apr, revised Sep 2003.
• Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark, 2002, "Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0216, Jun, revised Aug 2002.
• Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002, "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0211003, Nov.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002, "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0211008, Nov.
• Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2002, "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0211010, Nov.
• Christian List, 2002, "On the Significance of the Absolute Margin," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0211004, Nov.
• Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Breton, Michel Le, 2002, "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 628.
• Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 2002, "Approximate Cores Of Games And Economies With Clubs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 634.
• Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002, "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 640.
• Märkt, Jörg, 2002, "Zur Methodik der Verfassungsökonomik: Die Aufgabe eines vertragstheoretisch argumentierenden Ökonoms," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, Walter Eucken Institut e.V., number 02/4.
• Bischoff, Ivo, 2002, "Institutional choice in social dilemmas: An experimental approach," Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, number 63.
• Francois Maniquet, 2002, "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, number 0015, Apr.
• Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002, "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, number 0016, May.
• Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, , "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 269408, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269408.
• Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, , "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 269414, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269414.
• Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002, "Voting by Committees with Exit," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 511.02, May.
• Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers, 2002, "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 512.02, May.
• Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002, "A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 535.02, Sep.
• Stefka Koeva, 2002, "Market Order and Social Institutions: the Theory of F. Haiek and the Newly Emerging Market Economies," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 68-87.
• Fleurbaey, Marc, 2017, "Social choice and just institutions: new perspectives," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 333, May.
• Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2002, "A “Tragedy of the Clubs”: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 4, issue 1, pages 115-136, January, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00091.
• Carmen Bevia & Inigo Iturbe–Ormaetxe, 2002, "Redistribution and Subsidies for Higher Education," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 104, issue 2, pages 321-340, June, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00289.
• Andrei Gomberg & Cesar Martinelli & Ricard Torres, 2002, "Anonymity in Large Societies," Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, number 0211, Nov.
• Ricard Torres, 2002, "Smallness of Invisible Dictators," Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, number 0213, Nov, revised Sep 2003.
• Jackson, Matthew O. & Barbera, Salvador, 2002, "Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1145, Nov.
• Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002, "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1150, Nov.
• Jackson, Matthew O. & Dutta, Bhaskar & Le Breton, Michele, 2002, "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1152, Nov.
• Arcenio Pecha & Jaime Villamil, 2002, "Relaciones de preferencia y elección social en una estructura difusa," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
• Tirole, Jean & Bénabou, Roland & Battaglini, Marco, 2002, "Self Control in Peer Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 3149, Jan.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2002, "Existence of an Equilibrium in a General Competitive Exchange Economy with Indivisible Goods and Money," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 3, issue 1, pages 135-147, May.
• Chateauneuf, Alain & Gajdos, Thibault & Wilthien, Pierre-Henry, 2002, "The Principle of Strong Diminishing Transfer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 103, issue 2, pages 311-333, April.
• Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002, "Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 104, issue 2, pages 462-472, June.
• Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen, 2002, "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 105, issue 2, pages 263-277, August.
• Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2002, "Sharing a River," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 107, issue 2, pages 453-462, December.
• Belleflamme, Paul, 2002, "Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 1, pages 153-176, March.
• La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002, "Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue 2, pages 235-273, August.
• Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2002, "A Theory of Social Custom of Which Soft Growth May Be One Consequence. Tales of the European Stability Pact," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE), number 2002-07.
• Yoav Wachsman, 2002, "The Effects of Group Interaction in a Public Goods Experiment With Two Exchanges," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 200205.
• Alain Chateauneuf & Thibault Gajdos Preuss & Pierre-Henry Wilthien, 2002, "The Principle of Strong Diminishing Transfer," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-00085936.
• Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes & M. Tataru, 2002, "The likelihood of Condorcet's profiles," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-00069518.
• Alain Chateauneuf & Thibault Gajdos Preuss & Pierre-Henry Wilthien, 2002, "The Principle of Strong Diminishing Transfer," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-00085936.
• Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2002, "A Theory of Social Custom of Which Soft Growth May Be One Consequence. Tales of the European Stability Pact," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-01065024, Oct.
• Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2002, "A Theory of Social Custom of Which Soft Growth May Be One Consequence. Tales of the European Stability Pact," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01065024, Oct.
• Voorneveld, Mark, 2002, "Characterization of Pareto Dominance," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 487, Jan.
• Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002, "Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 582, Jun.
• Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Larsson, Bo, 2002, "Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2002:14, Feb, revised 09 May 2003.
• Svensson , Lars-Gunnar, 2002, "Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2002:17, Jun.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002, "Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-08, Sep.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002, "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-10, Nov.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002, "The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-11, Nov.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002, "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 121, Nov.
• Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002, "The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 122, Nov.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一 & タデヌマ, コウイチ, 2002, "Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 128, Dec.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一 & タデヌマ, コウイチ & Xu, Yongsheng, 2002, "The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics in a Non-Welfaristic Approach," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 48, Jan.
• Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2002, "Efficient Mechanisms for Multiple Public Goods," Discussion Paper Series, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, number dp314, Jan.
• Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2005, "Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models," Discussion Paper Series, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, number dp404, Sep.
• Doan Hong Quang & Neil Vousden, 2002, "Unionisation, Unemployment and Economic growth," International and Development Economics Working Papers, International and Development Economics, number idec02-10.
• Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002, "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, number 143, revised Sep 2003.
• Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002, "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 43, issue 4, pages 1035-1052, November.
• Paulo P. Corte-Real & Paulo Trigo Pereira, 2002, "The voter who wasn't there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention," Working Papers Department of Economics, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa, number 2002/04.
• José Alcalde & José Angel Silva & María del Carmen Marco, 2002, "Bankruptcy Games And The Ibn Ezra'S Proposal," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 2002-28, Dec.
• Buly A Cardak, 2002, "Education Choice, Endogenous Growth and Income Distribution," Working Papers, School of Economics, La Trobe University, number 2002.03, Mar.
• Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden, 2002, "Responsibility and Reward," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 59, issue 1, pages 120-140, February.
• EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002, "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2002-03.
• Christian List, 2002, "A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2002-W15, May.
• Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2002, "A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2002-W23, Sep.

2001

• Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001, "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 91, issue 5, pages 1478-1497, December.
• Angela A. Hung & Charles R. Plott, 2001, "Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 91, issue 5, pages 1508-1520, December.
• Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 39, issue 3, pages 869-896, September.
• Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, , "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 269256, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269256.
• Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, , "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 269402, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269402.
• Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001, "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 492.01, Jul.
• Vito Peragine & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2001, "On Preference, Freedom and Diversity," SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", number 0003, Nov, revised Nov 2001.
• Fleurbaey, Marc, 2017, "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defence," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 328, May.
• Jean Hindriks, 2001, "Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 3, issue 1, pages 95-120, January, DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00056.
• Ismail Saglam, 2001, "A Unified Implementation Theory," Working Papers, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, number 2001/01, Jan.
• Helpman Elhanan & Persson Torsten, 2001, "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-33, November, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1008.
• Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2001, "Order-restricted preferences and strategy-proof social choices rules," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA, number 191, Jun.
• A Charlwood, 2001, "Why Do Non-Union Employees Want To Unionise? Evidence from Britain," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp0498, Jun.
• Bernard Enjolras, 2001, "Organizaciones voluntarias y democracia. Bases teóricas," CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa, CIRIEC-España, issue 37, pages 141-175, April.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001, "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2001040, Oct.
• von Hagen, Jurgen & Keser, Claudia & Gardner, Roy J & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2001, "Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2661, Jan.
• Wallner, Klaus, 2001, "Specific Enlargement and the EU Enlargement," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2837, Jun.
• Widgren, Mika, 2001, "Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 3042, Nov.
• Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 2001, "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, volume 95, issue 3, pages 663-672, September.
• CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001, "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 722, Feb.
• CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001, "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 726, Mar.
• Tyson, Chris, 2001, "The Foundations of Imperfect Decision Making," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 1714, Nov.
• Klaus, Bettina, 2001, "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 34, issue 1, pages 64-82, January.
• Ma, Jinpeng, 2001, "Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 34, issue 1, pages 83-103, January.
• Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001, "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 37, issue 1, pages 40-78, October.
• Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2001, "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 101, issue 2, pages 423-436, December.
• Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel, 2001, "Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 2, pages 117-140, November.
• Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 2001, "Individually rational union membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 1, pages 117-137, March.
• Charlwood, Andy, 2001, "Why do non-union employees want to unionise? Evidence from Britain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 20116, Jun.
• Galeotti, Andrea & W. Rogers, Brian, 2012, "Strategic immunization and group structure," ISER Working Paper Series, Institute for Social and Economic Research, number 2012-16, Aug.
• Benabou, R. & Battaglini, M., 2001, "Self-Control in peer Groups," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs, number 217.
• Eliaz, K., 2001, "Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem as Special Cases of a Single Theorem," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 2001-11.
• Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001, "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00597193.
• Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001, "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00597200, Oct.
• Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001, "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01064884.
• Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001, "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01065004, Oct.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一 & Xu, Yongsheng & 徐, 永勝, 2001, "Envy-Free Configurations in the Market Economy," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2001-07, Jul.
• Naoki Yoshihara, 2001, "Solidarity and Nash Bargaining Solution," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a409, Mar.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一 & タデヌマ, コウイチ & Xu, Yongsheng, 2001, "Envy-Free Configurations in the Market Economy," Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 31, Jul.
• Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman, 2001, "A Value on 'AN," Discussion Paper Series, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, number dp276, Oct.
• Ding Lu, 2001, "Shared network investment," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 73, issue 3, pages 299-312, October, DOI: 10.1007/BF01257925.
• Pete, Péter, 2001, "Elemzési keret egy leendő államháztartási reform alapelveihez
  [Analytical framework for deciding the underlying principles of future reform of the public-finance system]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 10, pages 810-823.
• EHLERS, Lars & WEYMARK, John A., 2001, "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2001-30.
• Daniel S. Hamermesh & Peter Schmidt, 2001, ""Hall of Fame" Voting: The Econometric Society," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 8435, Aug.
• Christian List, 2001, "Complex Collective Decisions and the Probability of Collective Inconsistencies," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2001-W23, Nov.
• Saglam, Ismail, 2001, "A Unified Implementation Theory," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 1898, Jan.
• Tian, Guoqiang, 2001, "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 41229, revised Oct 2005.
• Jules Gazon, 2001, "Mondialisation : formation d'une pensée unique? Une approche formalisée du pouvoir," SEII Working Papers, University of Liège Faculty of Econonomics, Management and Social Sciences Department of Economics Service of International and Interregional Economics, number 010602, May.
• Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2001, "Social decision rules are not immune to conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 2, issue 1, pages 59-67, March.
• Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2001, "The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 2, issue 3, pages 243-249, November.
• Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001, "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, volume 10, issue 4, pages 287-316, July, DOI: 10.1023/A:1011252808608.
• Jingang Zhao, 2001, "The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 18, issue 3, pages 635-648.
• Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001, "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 29, issue 4, pages 487-494.
• Bettina Klaus, 2001, "original papers : Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 6, issue 1, pages 85-98.
• Sang-Chul Suh, 2001, "Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 6, issue 3, pages 447-460.
• Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001, "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 18, issue 1, pages 193-205.
• Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001, "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 18, issue 3, pages 409-414.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 2001, "Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 18, issue 3, pages 543-553.
• Szilvia Pápai, 2001, "Strategyproof single unit award rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 18, issue 4, pages 785-798.
• Rui Nuno Baleiras, 2001, "To fragment or to consolidate jurisdictions: the optimal architecture of government," Nova SBE Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, number wp401.
• Grigoriev, A. & van de Klundert, J., 2001, "Throughput rate optimization in high multiplicity sequencing problems," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR), number 006, Jan, DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2001006.
• Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2001, "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0113, Jul.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Neunzig, Alexander R. & Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg, 2001, "One Market, One Law: EU Enlargement in light of the economic theory of optimal legal areas," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 2001-03.

2000

• Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000, "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 39, Oct.
• Dal Bo, E., 2000, "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 9939.
• Paul Belleflamme, 2000, "Coordination on Formal vs. de facto Standards: A Dynamic Approach," Working Papers, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, number 412, Apr.
• Jorge Iván González, 2000, "La ilegalidad, los metaordenamientos y la metapreferencias," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, volume 2, issue 2, pages 37-52, January-J.
• Jules Gazon, 2000, "From economic structure to power structure : a structural approach," SEII Working Papers, University of Liège Faculty of Econonomics, Management and Social Sciences Department of Economics Service of International and Interregional Economics, number 010601, Aug.
• Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000, "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 15, issue 3, pages 689-700.
• Walter Trockel, 2000, "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 2, pages 277-294.
• Jean-FranÚois Laslier, 2000, "Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 17, issue 2, pages 269-282.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 2000, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 17, issue 3, pages 393-402.
• Borm, P.E.M. & van den Brink, J.R. & Levinsky, R. & Slikker, M., 2000, "On Two New Social Choice Correspondences," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2000-125.
• Ten Raa, T. & Gilles, R.P., 2000, "Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2000-08.
• Borm, P.E.M. & van den Brink, J.R. & Levinsky, R. & Slikker, M., 2000, "On Two New Social Choice Correspondences," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 71885704-e24b-43ef-a029-8.
• Ten Raa, T. & Gilles, R.P., 2000, "Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number d688a825-f22d-4978-bd11-f.
• Uzi Segal, 2000, "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 108, issue 3, pages 569-589, June, DOI: 10.1086/262129.
• Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2000, "Social Choice with Analytic Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0023, Jun, revised Mar 2001.
• John A. Weymark, 2000, "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0029, Jul, revised Feb 2001.
• Pranab Bardhan & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2000, "Inequality, Market Imperfections, and Collective Action Problems," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0004001, Apr.
• Leech, D., 2000, "Computing Classical Power Indices For Large Finite Voting Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 579.
• Leech, D., 2000, "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 583.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & von Hagen, Jürgen & Keser, Claudia, 2000, "Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence," ZEI Working Papers, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, number B 18-2000.
• Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000, "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 4, pages 927-943, September.
• William C. Strange & Robert W. Helsley, 2000, "Social Interactions and the Institutions of Local Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 5, pages 1477-1490, December.
• Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson, 2003, "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 57, Aug.
• Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2000, "Maximising Happiness?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, volume 1, issue 2, pages 145-167, May, DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00009.
• Frey Bruno S. & Stutzer Alois, 2000, "Maximizing Happiness?," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 2, pages 145-167, May, DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00009.
• Anne Sibert & Anne C. Sibert, 1999, "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 226.
• Teresa Tono R., 2000, "Acceso a servicios de salud en Colombia: efectos del ingreso y de la disponibilidad de proveedores sobre el uso de servicios médicos," Coyuntura Social, Fedesarrollo, number 12963, Nov.
• La Ferrara, Eliana, 2000, "Inequality And Group Participation: Theory And Evidence From Rural Tanzania," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2433, Apr.
• Burkart, Mike & Wallner, Klaus, 2000, "Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2600, Nov.
• Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgren, Mika, 2000, "EU Reforms for Tomorrow's Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2623, Nov.
• Eliana La Ferrara, 2000, "Inequality and Group Participation: Theory and Evidence from Rural Tanzania," Development Working Papers, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, number 138, Jun.
• Tungodden, Bertil, 2000, "Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, volume 16, issue 2, pages 229-245, October.
• Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2000, "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1285, Nov.
• Mike Burkart & Klaus Wallner, 2000, "Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 0253, Aug.
• Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000, "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 0341, Aug.
• Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2000, "A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 0457, Aug.
• Michel LeBreton & John A. Weymark, 2000, "Social Choice with Analytic Preferences," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1050, Aug.
• Salvador Barbera & Carmen Bevia, 2000, "Self-Selection Consistent Choices," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1322, Aug.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 2000, "Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1790, Aug.
• Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 2000, "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 33, issue 2, pages 249-264, November.
• Burkart, Mike & Wallner, Klaus, 2000, "Club enlargement: early versus late admittance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119099, Sep.
• Klaus Wallner & Mike Burkart, 2000, "Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp359, Sep.
• Esteban, J. & Sakovics, J., 2000, "Temporary Alliance Formation: Endogenous Sequencing in Conflict Games," Papers, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza, number 43.
• Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 2000, "Inequality, Public Allocation and Development: Conflictual and Allocative Losses," Papers, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza, number 48.
• Maniquet, F., 2000, "A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 222.