Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.
|Date of creation:||07 Jun 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Bo Larsson, 2002.
"Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(3), pages 483-502.
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Larsson, Bo, 2000. "Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Money," Working Papers 2000:11, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Shinji Ohseto, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(1), pages 121-136.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2001. "House Allocation with Transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 329-355, October.
- Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
- Kevin Roberts, 1984. "The Theoretical Limits to Redistribution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 177-195.
- Schummer, James, 2000. "Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 293-318, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2002_017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.