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Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

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  • Shinji Ohseto

    (Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, 56-1, Tojiin-Kitamachi, Kita, Kyoto 603, Japan)

Abstract

We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinji Ohseto, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(1), pages 121-136.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:121-136 Note: Received: 26 March 1996 / Accepted: 23 September 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Svensson , Lars-Gunnar, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof," Working Papers 2002:17, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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