Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1999

• Gerhard Glomm & Roger Lagunoff, 1999, "A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901002, Jan.
• Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999, "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902001, Feb, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Sell, Friedrich L., 1999, "Die EWWU als Club: Positive und normative Implikationen für den Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Reformstaaten," Working Papers in Economics, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group, number 1999,4.

1998

• Jinpeng Ma, 1998, "Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1230, Oct.
• Jinpeng Ma, 1998, "Stable Matchings and the Small Core in Nash Equilibrium in the College Admissions Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1247, Nov.
• Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1998, "A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Working Papers, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, number 399, Jul.
• Robert G. Chambers & Rolf Färe, 1998, "Translation homotheticity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 3, pages 629-641.
• Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 1998, "Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 147-162.
• James A. Dearden, 1998, "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 189-198.
• HervÊ CrÉs & Yves Balasko, 1998, "Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 313-334.
• Thomas Brenner, 1998, "Can evolutionary algorithms describe learning processes?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 8, issue 3, pages 271-283.
• Walter Bossert & David Donaldson & Charles Blackorby, 1998, "Uncertainty and critical-level population principles," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-20.
• Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998, "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 15, issue 2, pages 211-236.
• Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 1998, "Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent," POLIS Working Papers, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS, number 1, Dec.
• Eduardo Ley & Mark F.J. Steel, 1998, "A model of management teams," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 19, issue 6, pages 355-363, DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199809)19:6.
• Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev, 1998, "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9804001, Apr.
• Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1998, "A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9808001, Aug.
• Leech, D., 1998, "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 510.
• Joaquín Pérez, 1998, "A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences," Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo, Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá., number 1/00, revised 2000.
• Nicolo, A., 1998, "Nash Implementation in Truthful Strategies, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency on the Restricted Domain of Leontief Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 418.98.
• Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017, "Single peakedness and coalition proofness," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 290, Apr.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 346, Jan.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998, "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 4, pages 952-974, November.
• Plott, Charles & Hung, Angela, 1998, "Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity Rewarding Institutions," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, number 1051, Dec.
• BARBERA, Salvador & MASCHLER, Michael & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998022, Apr.
• Cechlárová, Katarína & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998, "Stability in one-sided matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 4158, Jul.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998, "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998001, Jan.
• Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998, "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-10.
• Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998, "Voting Procedures," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-30.
• Yvon, PESQUEUX & Jean-François, VAUTIER, 1998, "Evaluation subjective de la perception d’une activité par une approche ergonomique," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 642, Feb.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 66, issue 6, pages 1353-1388, November.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 114, Jan.
• Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998, "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 3, pages 331-346, August.
• Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998, "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 1, pages 91-112, April.
• Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. outside ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19360, Jan.
• J. E. Peris & M-C. Sánchez, 1998, "Fixed agenda social choice correspondences," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 98-11.
• Svendsen, G.T., 1998, "Transitio to Market Economy Eastern Europe: The case of Lobbyism in Russia," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 98-1.
• Svendsen, G.T., 1998, "Social Capital, Economic Growth and Transition Economies," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 98-2.
• Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998, "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1816.
• Eric Maskin, 1998, "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1829.
• Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998, "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1837.
• Papai, S., 1998, "Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules," Papers, Koc University, number 1998/02.
• Peris, J.E. & Sanchez, M.C., 1998, "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9811.
• Helpman, E. & Persson, T., 1998, "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 08-98.
• Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1998, "Competing for Endorsements," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 09-98.
• Bottom, W.P. & Eavey, C.L. & Miller, G.J. & Nicoll, J., 1998, "The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions," Washington University, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, number 98-07.
• Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 1998, "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 1998-01, Jun.
• Suzumura Kotaro, 1998, "Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a341, Jan.
• Paterson, Iain, 1998, "Vote Weighting in the European Union," East European Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 54, Jan.
• Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1998, "- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1998-05, Apr.
• Hollard Guillaume, 1998, "An Asymmetric Model of Spatial Competition," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-12, Sep.
• Truchon, Michel, 1998, "An Extension of the Concordet Criterion and Kemeny Orders," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9813.
• Dennis Halcoussis & Anton D. Lowenberg, 1998, "Local Public Goods and Jim Crow," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 154, issue 4, pages 599-599, December.
• Cardak, B.A., 1998, "Preferences Over Education Expenditure," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 623.
• MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 1998, "Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9805.

1997

• Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 1997, "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-date Dependent Classical Principles," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 48, issue 3, pages 267-292, September.
• Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997, "Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: A Reconsideration," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1589, Mar.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997, "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1600, Mar.
• Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 1997, "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-36.
• Moulin, HervÈ & Shenker, Scott, 1997, "Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics, number 97-21.
• Barzel, Yoram, 1997, "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 4, pages 455-474, December.
• Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997, "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 237-270, August.
• Ok, Efe A., 1997, "On Opportunity Inequality Measurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 2, pages 300-329, December.
• Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997, "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 34, issue 3, pages 249-272, October.
• Demange, Gabrielle & Guesnerie, Roger, 1997, "Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 1, pages 7-17, April.
• Tomas Sjostrom, 1997, "Undominated Nash Implementaion with Collusion and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1791.
• Koray, S. & Sertel, M., 1997, "A Multiplication of Solution Concepts," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 162.
• Barzel, Y, 1997, "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 97-13.
• Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1997, "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1997_017.
• Kotaro Suzumura, 1997, "Consequences, Opportunities, and Procedures," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a338, Jul.
• Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997, "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 41, Feb.
• Csontos, László, 1997, "A politika tanulmányozása és a közgazdaságtan
  [The study of politics and political economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 557-568.
• Meszerics, Tamás, 1997, "Stratégiai viselkedés és bizottsági döntés
  [Strategic behaviour and committee decison]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 687-697.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1997, "Efficiency in Partnership Structures," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 552.
• Alain Chateauneuf & Michèle Cohen & Robert Kast, 1997, "Comonotone random variables in economics: A review of some results," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97032, Feb.
• Saglam, Ismail, 1997, "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 2330, May.
• Andreas Wagener, 1997, "Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems as Incomplete Social Contracts," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, number 62-97.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 257-276.
• Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1997, "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 305-333.
• Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 147-160.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1997, "Market arbitrage, social choice and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 161-198.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 303-318.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 4, pages 503-512.
• Ten Raa, T., 1997, "Club efficiency and Lindahl equilibrium," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-24.
• Matsui, Akihiko & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997, "Evolution and Interaction of Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number 97-F-26, Aug.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-03, Jun.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-04, Feb.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-05, Jan.
• Barzel, Y, 1997, "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-13.
• De Paola, M., 1997, "Welfare Measurement Under Habit Forming Tastes," University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK., number 9703.
• Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 1997, "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 97023, Mar.
• Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997, "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707008, Jul.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9705001, May, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Kirstein, Roland, 1997, "Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-04.

1996

• Salvador Barberà, 1996, "Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 9, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura, "Social Choice Re-Examined", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_3.
• Nick Baigent & Wulf Gaertner, 1996, "Never choose the uniquely largest A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249.
• Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996, "Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249, August.
• Steffen Ziss, 1996, "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 245-261, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499135.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996, "A robust theory of resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 13, issue 1, pages 1-10, January, DOI: 10.1007/BF00179093.
• Kochin, M.S. & Kochin, L.A., 1996, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 96-09.
• Segal, U., 1996, "How to Escape Dutch Books in Dynamic Choice," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9608.
• Segal, U., 1996, "Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9611.
• Perry, M. & Vincent, D.R., 1996, "The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9614.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604002, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1996, "The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 82.
• H. Peyton Young, 1996, "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 105-122, Spring.
• DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1996, "Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996055, Nov.
• Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996, "The Paradox of Multiple Elections," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-09.
• Ok, E.A., 1996, "On Opportunity Inequality Measurement," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-24.
• Ok, E.A. & Zhou, L., 1996, "Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-39.
• John Geanakoplos, 1996, "Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1123R3, Apr, revised Jun 2001.
• Saint-Paul, G., 1996, "Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 96-02.
• Demange, G. & Guesnerie, R., 1996, "Nonemptiness of the Core: Low Multidimensional Decisions Spaces and One-Dimensional Preferences," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 96-09.
• J.-F. Laslier, 1996, "Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-28.
• Bulkley, G. & Myles, G.D., 1996, "Individually Rational Union Membership," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9612.
• Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 1996, "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-Date Dependent Classical Principles," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a23.
• Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 1996, "Uncertainty and Critical-Level Population Principles: A Static Model," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a24.
• Amartya Sen, 1996, "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1766.
• Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996, "Competing for Endorsements," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1784.
• Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996, "A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9602.
• Truchon, M., 1996, "La democratie: oui, mais laquelle?," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9610.
• De Donder, P. & Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996, "A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 180.
• Laslier, J.F., 1996, "Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9628.
• Kochin, M.S. & Kochin, L.A., 1996, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 96-09.
• Ubbarao, K. & Ahmed, A.U. & Teklu, T., 1996, "Selected Social Safety Net Programs in the Philippines. Targeting, Cost Effectiveness, and option for Reform," World Bank - Discussion Papers, World Bank, number 317.
• Lindbeck , Assar, 1996, "Incentives in the Welfare State: Lessons for would-be welfare states," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 449, Feb.
• Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1996, "Redistribution of Asset Versus Redistribution of Income: Comments on Efficient Redistribution by Bowles and Gintis," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_025.
• Dennis Mueller, 1996, "Constitutional quandaries in Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 293-302, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF00119269.
• Satish Jain, 1996, "Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 64, issue 2, pages 195-212, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01250115.
• Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1996, "A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9602, revised Jun 1997.
• Truchon, Michel, 1996, "La démocratie: oui, mais laquelle?," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9610, revised Oct 1998.
• Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9604.
• Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 9604.

1995

• Brock, W.A. & Durlauf, S.N., 1995, "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9521.
• Barbera, S., 1995, "Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 292.95.
• DHILLON , Amrita, 1995, "Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1995052, Sep.
• Dhillon, Amrita, 1995, "Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 3912, Jul.
• Eduardo Ley & Mark F J Steel, 1995, "A Model of Management Teams," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 24, Jul.
• De Meyer, Bernard & Mongin, Philippe, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 2, pages 177-183, February.
• von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995, "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 39, issue 3-4, pages 771-779, April.
• Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1995, "Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs," Discussion Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 95.
• Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995, "Strategyproofness and Decomposability : Strict Orderning," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a37.
• Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995, "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a38.
• Baliga, S., 1995, "The Not-So-Secret Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation," Papers, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals, number 201.
• Heal, G.M., 1995, "Social Choice and Resource Allocation: A Topological Perspective," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-18.
• Chichilnisky, G. & Heal, G.M., 1995, "Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-19.
• Heal, G.M. & Chichilnisky, G., 1995, "The Geometry of Implementation: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Straightforward Games," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-22.
• Sonmez, T., 1995, "Strategy-Proofness in Many-To-One Matching Problems," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory, number 95-01.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.FJ., 1995, "A Model of Management Teams," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research, number 9586.
• Bernard de Meyer & Philippe Mongin, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-00259707.
• Bernard de Meyer & Philippe Mongin, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00259707.
• José Alcalde, 1995, "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1995-04, Jan.
• Urbán, László, 1995, "Közcélú szabályozás hatáselemzése. (Public policy elemzés)
  [Public policy analysis]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 3, pages 270-278.
• Csontos, László, 1995, "Fiskális illúziók, döntéselmélet és az államháztartási rendszer reformja
  [Fiscal illusions, decision theory, and public sector reform]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 12, pages 1118-1135.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.F.J., 1995, "A model of management teams," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1995-86.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.F.J., 1995, "A model of management teams," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 516c90df-00d7-4ea2-b88b-6.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1995, "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-02, Jun.
• Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M., 1995, "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR), number 012, Jan, DOI: 10.26481/umamet.1995012.
• William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1995, "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute, number 95-10-084, Oct.
• Nouweland, Anne van den & Wooders, Myrna, 2005, "Status Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 733.
• Cartwright, Edward & Conley, John & Wooders, Myrna, 2005, "The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 734.

1994

• Cebula, Richard & Koch, James, 1994, "Disseminating Scholarly Output: A Comment," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 53571, Nov.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994, "A robust theory of resource allocation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8599, Sep.
• José Alcalde, 1994, "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 275-287, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716626.
• Dominique Lepelley, 1994, "Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 289-299, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716627.
• Mark Gradstein, 1994, "Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 319-326, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716629.
• Tomas Sjöström, 1994, "Implementation and information in teams," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 327-341, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716630.
• Tomas Sjöström, 1994, "Implementation by demand mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 343-354, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716631.
• Tayfun Sönmez, 1994, "Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 365-380, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716633.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1994, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9408001, Aug, revised 06 Aug 1998.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1994, "Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9411001, Nov, revised 07 Sep 1998.
• DE MEYER, Bernard & MONGIN , Philippe, 1994, "A Note on Affine Aggregation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994014, Mar.
• Mihara, H.R., 1994, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 276.
• A. Barbosa, 1994, "Manipulating uncertainty," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, volume 5, issue 3, pages 255-271, September, DOI: 10.1007/BF02393260.

1993

• Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2010, "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 3212.
• Mariam, Yohannes & Galaty, John & Coffin, Garth, 1993, "The Contribution of Non-Physical Resources and Strategic Household Decision-making to Environmental and Policy Risks," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 409, Dec, revised 10 Dec 1994.
• Kebede, Yohannes, 1993, "The Limits to Common Resource Management: The Bypassed Commons or Commons without Tragedy," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 662, revised 01 May 1993.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1993, "Topoloy and economics: the contributions of S. Smale," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8485.

1992

• ALLEN, Beth, 1992, "Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1992021, Feb.