Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1997

• Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1997, "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1997_017.
• Kotaro Suzumura, 1997, "Consequences, Opportunities, and Procedures," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a338, Jul.
• Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997, "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 41, Feb.
• Csontos, László, 1997, "A politika tanulmányozása és a közgazdaságtan
  [The study of politics and political economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 557-568.
• Meszerics, Tamás, 1997, "Stratégiai viselkedés és bizottsági döntés
  [Strategic behaviour and committee decison]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 687-697.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1997, "Efficiency in Partnership Structures," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 552.
• Alain Chateauneuf & Michèle Cohen & Robert Kast, 1997, "Comonotone random variables in economics: A review of some results," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97032, Feb.
• Saglam, Ismail, 1997, "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 2330, May.
• Andreas Wagener, 1997, "Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems as Incomplete Social Contracts," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, number 62-97.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 257-276.
• Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1997, "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 305-333.
• Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 147-160.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1997, "Market arbitrage, social choice and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 161-198.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1997, "Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 303-318.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 4, pages 503-512.
• Ten Raa, T., 1997, "Club efficiency and Lindahl equilibrium," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-24.
• Matsui, Akihiko & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997, "Evolution and Interaction of Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number 97-F-26, Aug.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-03, Jun.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-04, Feb.
• Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997, "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-05, Jan.
• Barzel, Y, 1997, "Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 97-13.
• De Paola, M., 1997, "Welfare Measurement Under Habit Forming Tastes," University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK., number 9703.
• Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 1997, "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics, number 97023, Mar.
• Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997, "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707008, Jul.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1997, "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9705001, May, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Kirstein, Roland, 1997, "Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-04.

1996

• Salvador Barberà, 1996, "Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 9, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura, "Social Choice Re-Examined", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_3.
• Nick Baigent & Wulf Gaertner, 1996, "Never choose the uniquely largest A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249.
• Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996, "Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 239-249, August.
• Steffen Ziss, 1996, "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 245-261, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499135.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996, "A robust theory of resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 13, issue 1, pages 1-10, January, DOI: 10.1007/BF00179093.
• Kochin, M.S. & Kochin, L.A., 1996, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics, number 96-09.
• Segal, U., 1996, "How to Escape Dutch Books in Dynamic Choice," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9608.
• Segal, U., 1996, "Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9611.
• Perry, M. & Vincent, D.R., 1996, "The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9614.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604002, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1996, "The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 82.
• H. Peyton Young, 1996, "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 105-122, Spring.
• DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1996, "Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996055, Nov.
• Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996, "The Paradox of Multiple Elections," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-09.
• Ok, E.A., 1996, "On Opportunity Inequality Measurement," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-24.
• Ok, E.A. & Zhou, L., 1996, "Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-39.
• John Geanakoplos, 1996, "Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1123R3, Apr, revised Jun 2001.
• Saint-Paul, G., 1996, "Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 96-02.
• Demange, G. & Guesnerie, R., 1996, "Nonemptiness of the Core: Low Multidimensional Decisions Spaces and One-Dimensional Preferences," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 96-09.
• J.-F. Laslier, 1996, "Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-28.
• Bulkley, G. & Myles, G.D., 1996, "Individually Rational Union Membership," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9612.
• Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 1996, "Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-Date Dependent Classical Principles," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a23.
• Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 1996, "Uncertainty and Critical-Level Population Principles: A Static Model," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a24.
• Amartya Sen, 1996, "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1766.
• Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996, "Competing for Endorsements," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1784.
• Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996, "A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9602.
• Truchon, M., 1996, "La democratie: oui, mais laquelle?," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique, number 9610.
• De Donder, P. & Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996, "A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 180.
• Laslier, J.F., 1996, "Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9628.
• Kochin, M.S. & Kochin, L.A., 1996, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, number 96-09.
• Ubbarao, K. & Ahmed, A.U. & Teklu, T., 1996, "Selected Social Safety Net Programs in the Philippines. Targeting, Cost Effectiveness, and option for Reform," World Bank - Discussion Papers, World Bank, number 317.
• Lindbeck , Assar, 1996, "Incentives in the Welfare State: Lessons for would-be welfare states," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 449, Feb.
• Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1996, "Redistribution of Asset Versus Redistribution of Income: Comments on Efficient Redistribution by Bowles and Gintis," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_025.
• Dennis Mueller, 1996, "Constitutional quandaries in Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 293-302, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF00119269.
• Satish Jain, 1996, "Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 64, issue 2, pages 195-212, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01250115.
• Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1996, "A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9602, revised Jun 1997.
• Truchon, Michel, 1996, "La démocratie: oui, mais laquelle?," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9610, revised Oct 1998.
• Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9604.
• Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 9604.

1995

• Brock, W.A. & Durlauf, S.N., 1995, "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9521.
• Barbera, S., 1995, "Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 292.95.
• DHILLON , Amrita, 1995, "Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1995052, Sep.
• Dhillon, Amrita, 1995, "Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 3912, Jul.
• Eduardo Ley & Mark F J Steel, 1995, "A Model of Management Teams," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 24, Jul.
• De Meyer, Bernard & Mongin, Philippe, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 2, pages 177-183, February.
• von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995, "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 39, issue 3-4, pages 771-779, April.
• Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1995, "Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs," Discussion Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 95.
• Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995, "Strategyproofness and Decomposability : Strict Orderning," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a37.
• Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995, "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a38.
• Baliga, S., 1995, "The Not-So-Secret Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation," Papers, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals, number 201.
• Heal, G.M., 1995, "Social Choice and Resource Allocation: A Topological Perspective," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-18.
• Chichilnisky, G. & Heal, G.M., 1995, "Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-19.
• Heal, G.M. & Chichilnisky, G., 1995, "The Geometry of Implementation: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Straightforward Games," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-22.
• Sonmez, T., 1995, "Strategy-Proofness in Many-To-One Matching Problems," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory, number 95-01.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.FJ., 1995, "A Model of Management Teams," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research, number 9586.
• Bernard de Meyer & Philippe Mongin, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-00259707.
• Bernard de Meyer & Philippe Mongin, 1995, "A note on affine aggregation," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00259707.
• José Alcalde, 1995, "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1995-04, Jan.
• Urbán, László, 1995, "Közcélú szabályozás hatáselemzése. (Public policy elemzés)
  [Public policy analysis]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 3, pages 270-278.
• Csontos, László, 1995, "Fiskális illúziók, döntéselmélet és az államháztartási rendszer reformja
  [Fiscal illusions, decision theory, and public sector reform]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 12, pages 1118-1135.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.F.J., 1995, "A model of management teams," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1995-86.
• Ley, E. & Steel, M.F.J., 1995, "A model of management teams," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 516c90df-00d7-4ea2-b88b-6.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1995, "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-02, Jun.
• Klaus, B.E. & Storcken, A.J.A. & Peters, H.J.M., 1995, "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR), number 012, Jan, DOI: 10.26481/umamet.1995012.
• William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1995, "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute, number 95-10-084, Oct.
• Nouweland, Anne van den & Wooders, Myrna, 2005, "Status Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 733.
• Cartwright, Edward & Conley, John & Wooders, Myrna, 2005, "The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 734.

1994

• Cebula, Richard & Koch, James, 1994, "Disseminating Scholarly Output: A Comment," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 53571, Nov.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994, "A robust theory of resource allocation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8599, Sep.
• José Alcalde, 1994, "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 275-287, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716626.
• Dominique Lepelley, 1994, "Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 289-299, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716627.
• Mark Gradstein, 1994, "Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 319-326, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716629.
• Tomas Sjöström, 1994, "Implementation and information in teams," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 327-341, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716630.
• Tomas Sjöström, 1994, "Implementation by demand mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 343-354, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716631.
• Tayfun Sönmez, 1994, "Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 1, issue 1, pages 365-380, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02716633.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1994, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9408001, Aug, revised 06 Aug 1998.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1994, "Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9411001, Nov, revised 07 Sep 1998.
• DE MEYER, Bernard & MONGIN , Philippe, 1994, "A Note on Affine Aggregation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994014, Mar.
• Mihara, H.R., 1994, "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 276.
• A. Barbosa, 1994, "Manipulating uncertainty," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, volume 5, issue 3, pages 255-271, September, DOI: 10.1007/BF02393260.

1993

• Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2010, "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 3212.
• Mariam, Yohannes & Galaty, John & Coffin, Garth, 1993, "The Contribution of Non-Physical Resources and Strategic Household Decision-making to Environmental and Policy Risks," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 409, Dec, revised 10 Dec 1994.
• Kebede, Yohannes, 1993, "The Limits to Common Resource Management: The Bypassed Commons or Commons without Tragedy," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 662, revised 01 May 1993.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1993, "Topoloy and economics: the contributions of S. Smale," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8485.

1992

• ALLEN, Beth, 1992, "Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1992021, Feb.

1991

• Le Breton, M. & Weymark, J.A., 1991, "Social Choice with Analytic Preferences," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 91a02.

1990

• Alan B. Krueger, 1990, "Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination in the Fast Food Industry," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 3334, Apr.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990, "General equilibrium and social choice with increasing returns," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8124.
• Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990, "Social choice and the closed convergence topology," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 8353, Jul.

1989

• James M. Buchanan, 1989, "Better than Ploughing," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 12, in: J. A. Kregel, "Recollections of Eminent Economists", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09776-0_12.

1988

• Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1988, "Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 88-14, Nov.

1987

• Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis, 1987, "In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: Reply," Public Choice, Springer, volume 54, issue 3, pages 289-290, August, DOI: 10.1007/BF00125652.
• Alan B. Krueger, 1987, "Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination of the Fast Food Industry," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 606, Sep.
• Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009, "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 920.

1986

• Cebula, Richard & Kafoglis, Milton, 1986, "In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity": Reply," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 51239, Nov.

1983

• Richard J. Cebula, 1983, "Right‐to‐Work Laws and Geographic Differences in Living Costs: An Analysis of Effects of the ‘Union Shop’ Ban for the Years 1974, 1976, and 1978," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, volume 42, issue 3, pages 329-340, July, DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1983.tb01718.x.

1982

• Cebula, Richard, 1982, "Right-to-Work Laws and Geographic Differences in Living Costs: An Analysis of Effects of the "Union Shop" Ban for the Years 1974, 1976, and 1978," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 54440, Mar.

0

• Imre Fertő & László Á Kóczy & Attila Kovács & Balázs R Sziklai, 0, "The power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, volume 47, issue 5, pages 1897-1919.
• Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2020, "A Master of Two Servants: The Effect of Separation of Powers on Public Accountability and Social Welfare," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, number 10612466, Jul.
• Ken Chan, 0000, "The collective voice of businesses: How companies can effectively use trade associations in corporate political activity," Proceedings of Economics and Finance Conferences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, number 14115871.
• Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Barton E. Lee, , "Political Capital," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2019-04.
• Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John, 2018, "Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Bosmans, Kristof & Decancq, Koen & Ooghe, Erwin, 2018, "Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Bardhi, Arjada & Guo, Yingni, 2018, "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Almagro, Milena & Andrés-Cerezo, David, 2020, "The construction of national identities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Kimya, Mert, 2020, "Equilibrium coalitional behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2020, "Costly verification in collective decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 3, July.
• Kambe, Shinsuke, 2019, "An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 3, July.
• Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2023, "Collective hold-up," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 2024, "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Feng, Tangren & Niemeyer, Axel & Wu, Qinggong, 2023, "The limits of ex post implementation without transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2024, "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 2, May.
• Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023, "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Brandt, Felix & Lederer, Patrick, 2023, "Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Miyagishima, Kaname, 2023, "Time-consistent fair social choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Han, Xiang, 2024, "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Nebel, Jacob M., 2024, "Extensive measurement in social choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 4, November.
• Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2025, "Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Adler, Matthew D. & Bossert, Walter & Cato, Susumu & Kamaga, Kohei, 2025, "Ex-post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 4, November.
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