A note on affine aggregation
If a vector-valued function has convex range and one of its components is related to the others by a Pareto-like condition, that component must be affine w.r.t. the others; sign restrictions on the coefficients follow from suitably strengthening the unanimity condition. The theorem is applied to social choice and decision theories.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mongin Philippe, 1995.
"Consistent Bayesian Aggregation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 313-351, August.
- Mongin, P., . "Consistent Bayesian aggregation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1176, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MONGIN, Philippe, 1993. "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation," CORE Discussion Papers 1993019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David & Vind, Karl, 1983. "On State Dependent Preferences and Subjective Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1021-31, July.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:2:p:177-183. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.